P7_TA-PROV(2011)0103
Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu muutmine seoses stabiilsusmehhanismiga liikmesriikide jaoks, mille rahaühik on euro *
A7-0052/2011
Euroopa Parlamendi 23. märtsi 2011. aasta resolutsioon Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse eelnõu kohta, millega muudetakse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklit 136 seoses stabiilsusmehhanismiga liikmesriikide jaoks, mille rahaühik on euro (00033/2010 – C7-0014/2011 – 2010/0821(NLE))
Euroopa Parlament
,
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võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 48 lõikeid 6 ja 2;
–
võttes arvesse Euroopa Ülemkogule esitatud rakkerühma lõppraportit „Majanduse juhtimise tugevdamine ELis”;
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võttes arvesse Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse eelnõud, millega muudetakse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklit 136 ja mis esitati Euroopa Ülemkogule 16. detsembril 2010 (00033/2010 - C7-0014/2011 );
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võttes arvesse Euroopa Ülemkogu eesistuja, eurorühma esimehe ja rahandusvoliniku kirju, mis on lisatud käesolevale resolutsioonile;
–
võttes arvesse kodukorra artiklit 74b;
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võttes arvesse eelarvekomisjoni 18. veebruari 2011. aasta kirja põhiseaduskomisjonile;
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võttes arvesse põhiseaduskomisjoni raportit ning majandus- ja rahanduskomisjoni arvamust ( A7-0052/2011 ),
A.
arvestades, et Eurooa Liidu lepingu artikli 3 lõikes 4 on sätestatud, et „Liit rajab majandus- ja rahaliidu, mille rahaühik on euro”;
B.
arvestades, et Ühendkuningriik on ühisraha kasutuselevõtust loobunud;
C.
arvestades, et Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 3 lõike 1 kohaselt on liidul ainupädevus „nende liikmesriikide rahapoliitikas, mille rahaühik on euro”;
D.
arvestades, et Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 5 lõikes 1 on sätestatud: „liikmesriigid koordineerivad liidu piires oma majanduspoliitikat”, ning liikmesriikide suhtes, mille rahaühik on euro, kohaldatakse erisätteid;
E.
arvestades, et kui Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse eelnõu vastu võetakse, võib see viia sellise mehhanismi loomiseni, mis jääb liidu pädevusest täielikult väljapoole ja milles liidu institutsioonid ei mängi mingit rolli;
F.
arvestades, et liidu institutsioonide osalemine Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismis tuleks täielikult tagada ja püsivalt kindlustada ning et tuleks luua võimalus liidu eelarve kasutamiseks tagatissüsteemis;
G.
arvestades, et tuleks uurida kõiki võimalusi, kuidas asetada Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanism täielikult liidu institutsioonilisse raamistikku ning kuidas kaasata sellesse liikmesriike, kelle rahaühik ei ole euro; arvestades, et see võib muu hulgas tähendada tõhustatud koostööd puudutava Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 20 rakendamist, kui see on vajalik, et tagada liidu majanduspoliitika järjekindlus;
H.
arvestades, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi käsitlevad eeskirjad peaks võimaluse korral esitama komisjon; ja need peaksid aitama tagada asjakohaseid kontrolli, vastutuse ja läbipaistvuse nõudeid;
I.
arvestades, et lisaks Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi rakendamisele tuleks suurendada stabiilsuse ja majanduskasvu pakti ennetavat ja korrigeerivat mõju ning võtta meetmeid keskpika ja pikaajalise konkurentsivõime tagamiseks ning liikmesriikide vahelise makromajandusliku tasakaalustamatuse vastu võitlemiseks;
J.
arvestades, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi täiendamiseks peaks liit edendama konsolideeritud eurovõlakirjade turgu;
K.
arvestades, et komisjon peaks esitama seadusandlikud ettepanekud ja vajaduse korral ettepanekud aluslepingute muutmiseks, et keskpikal perioodil oleks võimalik luua liidu ja eriti euroala majanduse juhtimise süsteem, millega tugevdataks majanduse ühtekuuluvust ja konkurentsivõimet ning stabiliseeritaks finantssüsteemi;
L.
arvestades, et Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 48 lõige 6 võimaldab Euroopa Ülemkogul võtta pärast Euroopa Parlamendiga konsulteerimist vastu otsuse, millega muudetakse täielikult või osaliselt Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu kolmandat osa, ilma et see muudaks tasakaalu liidu ja liikmesriikide pädevuste vahel;
M.
arvestades, et liidu pädevuse suurendamiseks või vähendamiseks tuleb kasutada tavalist läbivaatamismenetlust;
N.
arvestades, et Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu igasugune edasine muutmine peab toimuma tavalist läbivaatamismenetlust kasutades;
O.
arvestades, et kavandatud otsus saab jõustuda üksnes pärast seda, kui liikmesriigid on selle kooskõlas oma põhiseadusest tulenevate nõuetega heaks kiitnud,
1.
rõhutab, et nende liikmesriikide rahapoliitika, mille rahaühik on euro, on liidu ainupädevuses ning see on olnud ühenduse poliitika alates Maastrichti lepingust;
2.
rõhutab, kui oluline on euro nii Euroopa poliitika kui ka majanduse jaoks, ning peab väga tähtsaks kõikide liikmesriikide väljendatud kindlat toetust euroala stabiilsusele ja liikmesriikide poolt üles näidatud vastutustundlikku ja solidaarset suhtumist;
3.
rõhutab, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanism on oluline osa meetmetest, mille eesmärk on kujundada uus raamistik, mis suurendab eelarvedistsipliini ning liikmesriikide majandus- ja rahanduspoliitika koordineerimist ja peaks edendama Euroopa Liidu ühist lahenduste otsimist majanduskasvu probleemidele, aitab kõrvaldada majanduslikku ja sotsiaalset tasakaalustamatust ning suurendab konkurentsivõimet;
4.
märgib, et nõukogu ei ole kasutanud kõiki aluslepingutes sisalduvaid võimalusi stabiilsuse ja majanduskasvu pakti täielikuks jõustamiseks ning Euroopa Liidu tasandil majanduse paremaks koordineerimiseks;
5.
on seisukohal, et tuleb minna kaugemale euroala stabiliseerimiseks mõeldud ajutistest meetmetest ning et liit peab kehtestama omad majanduse juhtimise meetmed, sealhulgas niisuguse poliitika ja vahendite abil, mis on töötatud välja säästva majanduskasvu edendamiseks liikmesriikides; on seisukohal, et stabiilsuse ja majanduskasvu pakti tugevdamine, Euroopa poolaasta, ELi 2020. aasta strateegia ja Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 136 muutmine seoses Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismiga on ainult esimesed sellesuunalised sammud;
6.
rõhutab, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanism ja selles sisalduvad ranged tingimused hõlmavad kõiki liikmesriike, kelle rahaühik on euro, ka väikeseid riike, kelle majandust võidakse pidada euroala kui terviku kindlustamisel vähemoluliseks;
7.
hoiatab, et kavatsus luua alaline stabiilsusmehhanism väljaspool ELi institutsioonilist raamistikku kujutab endast ohtu asutamislepingutel põhineva süsteemi terviklikkusele; on seisukohal, et komisjon peab olema selle mehhanismi juhatuse liige, mitte ainult vaatleja; märgib lisaks, et selles kontekstis peaks komisjonil olema õigus teha asjakohaseid algatusi, et saavutada asjaomaste liikmesriikide nõusolekuga Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi eesmärgid; rõhutab, et liikmesriigid peavad igal juhul austama liidu õigust ja selles sätestatud institutsioonide eelisõigusi;
8.
rõhutab, et alalise stabiilsusmehhanismi loomine ja toimimine peab olema täielikus kooskõlas demokraatliku otsustamisprotsessi kesksete põhimõtetega, nagu läbipaistvus, parlamentaarne kontroll ja demokraatlik vastutus; rõhutab, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanism peaks põhjalikult kaasama liidu rahandusküsimuste eest vastutavaid institutsioone ja organeid – Euroopa Komisjoni, Euroopa Keskpanka ja Euroopa Investeerimispanka; toonitab, et sellest mehhanismist ei tohi võrsuda Euroopa uut juhtimismudelit, mis ei küündi liidus saavutatud demokraatlike standardite tasemeni;
9.
peab kahetsusväärseks, et Euroopa Ülemkogu ei ole uurinud kõiki aluslepingutes sisalduvaid alalise stabiilsusmehhanismi loomise võimalusi; on eelkõige seisukohal, et majandus- ja rahaliitu (Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 3 lõige 4) ja nende liikmesriikide rahapoliitikat, mille rahaühik on euro, (Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 3 lõike 1 punkt c) puudutava liidu praeguse pädevuse raames oleks olnud kohasem kasutada Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikliga 136 nõukogule antud volitusi või rakendada Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklit 352 koostoimes Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklitega 133 ja 136;
10.
kutsub komisjoni üles otsima euroala finantsstabiilsuse ning säästva ja asjakohase majanduskasvu tagamiseks teisi mehhanisme ning esitama vastavad seadusandlikud ettepanekud; rõhutab, et Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanism peab sisaldama meetmeid, millega vähendada ohtu finants-, majanduslikule ja sotsiaalsele stabiilsusele, sealhulgas finantsturgude tõhus reguleerimine, stabiilsuse ja majanduskasvu pakti läbivaatamine ning parem majanduse koordineerimine, vahendite kasutuselevõtt makromajandusliku tasakaalutuse vähendamiseks euroalal ja ökoloogilisele üleseitusele suunatud meetmed;
11.
on lisaks seisukohal, et alalise stabiilsusmehhanismi loomine ja toimimine peaks toimuma Euroopa Liidu raamistikus ning selleks tuleks kasutada ka tõhustatud koostöö institutsioonilist mehhanismi, et kaasata kõikides etappides liidu institutsioone ning julgustada Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismis osalema neid liikmesriike, kelle rahaühik ei ole veel euro;
12.
märgib, et Euroopa Parlamendis toimunud arutluste taustal leppisid euroala riigipead ja valitsusjuhid oma 11. märtsi 2011. aasta kohtumisel europakti kontekstis kokku, et komisjon peaks täitma tugevat keskset rolli kohustuste rakendamise kontrollimisel, eelkõige tagamaks, et meetmed oleksid kooskõlas ELi eeskirjadega ja toetaksid neid ning et kaasataks Euroopa Parlament; märgib, et riigipead ja valitsusjuhid, kaaludes Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi põhijooni, leppisid kokku selles, et abi andmine liikmesriigile, mille rahaühik on euro, põhineb rangelt majanduslike ja fiskaalpoliitiliste kohanduste programmil ning võla jätkusuutlikkuse põhjalikul analüüsil, mille viivad läbi komisjon ja Rahvusvaheline Valuutafond koos Euroopa Keskpangaga;
13.
tunnustab positiivsed signaale, mis on tajutavad Euroopa Ülemkogu eesistuja, eurorühma esimehe ja rahandusvoliniku kirjades; märgib, et
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süvendatud järelevalve või makromajandusliku kohandamisprogrammi alusel kehtestatavad poliitilised tingimused määratakse kindlaks määrusega, mille ettepaneku esitab komisjon ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 136 alusel, et tagada kooskõla ELi mitmepoolse järelevalve raamistikuga;
–
juurdepääs Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi alusel antavale finantsabile sõltub riigivõla jätkusuutlikkuse põhjalikust analüüsist, mille viib läbi komisjon koos Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi ja Euroopa Keskpangaga; makromajandusliku kohandamisprogrammi alusel kehtestatakse ranged poliitilised tingimused, mis vastavad asjaomase liikmesriigi tasakaalustamatuse tõsidusele;
–
võttes aluseks abi saava liikmesriigi finantsvajaduste hinnangu, mille koostavad komisjon koos Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi ja Euroopa Keskpangaga, annab Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi juhatajate nõukogu komisjonile volitused pidada asjaomase liikmesriigiga läbirääkimisi makromajandusliku kohandamisprogrammi üle, komisjon kaasab ka Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi ja Euroopa Keskpanga;
–
komisjon teeb nõukogule ettepaneku võtta vastu otsus, millega kiidetakse heaks makromajanduslik programm, ning kui see otsus on vastu võetud, kirjutab komisjon alla vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumile nende liikmesriikide nimel, mille rahaühik on euro;
–
süvendatud järelevalve või makromajandusliku kohandamisprogrammi alusel kehtestatavad poliitilised tingimused on kooskõlas Euroopa Liidu järelevalve raamistikuga ning peavad tagama kooskõla ELi menetlustega;
–
liikmesriigi taotlusel võetakse finantsabi kasutusele pärast komisjoni ja Euroopa Keskpanga antud hinnangut selle kohta, kas on olemas oht kogu euroala finantsstabiilsusele;
–
komisjon koos Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi ja Euroopa Keskpangaga vastutab poliitiliste tingimuste täitmise järelevalve eest ning annab aru nõukogule ja direktorite nõukogule;
–
pärast arutelu juhatajate nõukogus esitab komisjon ettepaneku võtta vastu nõukogu otsus programmijärgse järelevalve rakendamise kohta;
–
nõukogu ja komisjon teavitavad korrapäraselt Euroopa Parlamenti Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi loomise ja toimimise kohta võimaldades nii parlamendil selle tegevust nõuetekohaselt kontrollida;
–
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu pädevusse kuulub vaidluste lahendamine vastavalt Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklile 273;
14.
toetab Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse eelnõu, vaatamata reservatsioonidele, et parem oleks olnud see esitada antud kujul käesoleva resolutsiooni I lisas; on nõus Euroopa Keskpanga arvamusega, milles toetatakse liidu meetodit, mis võimaldaks Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismil saada sobival hetkel liidu mehhanismiks; kutsub Euroopa Ülemkogu tagama, et
–
poliitilisi tingimusi käsitlev määrus võetakse vastu liidu seadusandliku tavamenetluse kohaselt;
–
igal liikmesriigil, mille rahaühik on euro ja mis on toetanud alalist stabiilsusmehhanismi, on sellele juurdepääs sõltumata riigi suurusest;
15.
tuletab meelde, et tulevane alaline stabiilsusmehhanism peaks toetuma liidu institutsioonidele, sest nii oleks võimalik vältida topeltstruktuuride loomist, mis mõjuks Euroopa integratsioonile kahjulikult;
16.
nõuab, et tagasimaksetele kohaldatavad laenutingimused alalises stabiilsusmehhanismis, juhul kui see aktiveeritakse, oleksid samasugused nagu maksebilansi ja makromajandusliku finantsabi vahendites, mida kasutab komisjon, st rangelt kompensatsioonilaenuna, ilma laenukulusid hõlmava marginaalita; on lisaks seisukohal, et alalise stabiilsusmehhanismi intressimäärad peaksid olema soodsad;
17.
rõhutab, et Euroopa Parlament peab kontrollima, kas liikmesriigid järgivad komisjoni kehtestatud majandussuuniseid ja täidavad Euroopa stabiilsusmehhanismi tingimusi, ning rõhutab, et iga liikmesriigi parlament osaleb täielikult – vastavalt oma eelarve ja kontrolli õigustele – igas etapis, eeskätt Euroopa poolaasta kontekstis, et suurendada iga vastuvõetud otsuse läbipaistvust ja vastutust;
18.
toetab komisjoni kavatsust „tagada tulevase mehhanismi ja liidu, eelkõige euroala majanduse juhtimise järjepidevus, järgides aluslepinguga liidule ja selle institutsioonidele antud pädevust”;
19.
rõhutab, et Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse muudetud eelnõu ei suurendaks liidu pädevust ning jääks seetõttu aluslepingu lihtsustatud läbivaatamismenetluse kohaldamisalasse; märgib hoopis, et otsusega ei tohi vähendada liidu institutsioonide pädevust majandus- ja rahapoliitika vallas ega nende liikmesriikide rahapoliitika vallas, kelle rahaühik on euro, ning mingil juhul ei tohi see piirata liidu õiguse, eelkõige Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artiklite 122 ja 143 ning liidu
acquis
' korrektset kohaldamist;
20.
kinnitab veel kord, et Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 48 lõike 6 kohaldamine on erandlik, ja tuletab meelde, et Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 48 lõike 3 kohaselt on Euroopa Parlamendil õigus nõuda konvendi kokkukutsumist liidu majanduse juhtimisega seotud institutsioonide, menetluste ja poliitika muutmiseks;
21.
teeb presidendile ülesandeks edastada käesolev resolutsioon Euroopa Ülemkogule, nõukogule, komisjonile ja Euroopa Keskpangale kui Euroopa Parlamendi arvamus vastavalt Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 48 lõike 6 teisele lõigule.
RESOLUTSIOONI I LISA
Euroopa Ülemkogu otsuse eelnõu artikli 1 muutmise ettepanek
Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 136 lõikele 1
lisatakse järgmised
lõigud:
Komisjoni soovituse alusel ja pärast Euroopa Parlamendiga konsulteerimist
võivad liikmesriigid, mille rahaühik on euro, luua stabiilsusmehhanismi, mis võetakse kasutusele, kui see on euroala stabiilsuse tagamiseks hädavajalik.
Mehhanismi alusel mis tahes vajaliku finantsabi andmine
otsustatakse komisjoni ettepaneku alusel ning see
toimub rangetel tingimustel
vastavalt liidu põhimõtetele ja eesmärkidele, nagu on sätestatud Euroopa Liidu lepingus ja käesolevas lepingus
.
Mehhanismi alusel antava finantsabi põhimõtted ja tingimuslikkuse reeglid ning kontroll sätestatakse määruses, mis on seadusandliku tavamenetluse kohaselt vastu võetud.
Artikli 136 lõige 2 asendatakse järgmisega:
„2.
Lõike 1 punktides a ja b sätestatud meetmete vastuvõtmisel hääletavad ainult neid liikmesriike esindavad nõukogu liikmed, mille rahaühik on euro.
Nimetatud liikmete kvalifitseeritud häälteenamust määratletakse vastavalt artikli 238 lõike 3 punktile a.
Lõike 1 kolmandas lõigus sätestatud meetmete vastuvõtmisel hääletavad ainult mehhanismis osalevaid liikmesriike esindavad nõukogu liikmed.
RESOLUTSIOONI II LISA
Euroopa Ülemkogu eesistuja kiri raportööridele
Brussels, 22 March 2011
Dear Mr Brok, Dear Mr Gualtieri,
Following your various meetings and discussions with myself and members of my cabinet about the proposed amendment to Article 136 of the Treaty with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, allow me send you the attached paper, drawn up by my cabinet, which examines and responds to the concerns you expressed.
Mr Juncker, President of the Euro Group, and Mr Ollie Rehn, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, are writing to you separately on the outcome of the negotiations on the detail of the future Mechanism, which I fully endorse.
I am sure that you will agree that all this should give Parliament a broad level of satisfaction with regard to the points laid out in option b) of your report.
As you know, this treaty amendment is coming before the 24-25 March European Council.
You will appreciate the importance and urgency of this matter.
Yours sincerely
(signed)
Herman Van Rompuy
Annex
Concerning
option a)
in paragraph 12 of the report, which proposes to redraft the treaty amendment, it should be pointed out that this draft treaty amendment has been very carefully drawn up to make it acceptable to all Member States, which must all ratify it.
There is virtually no prospect of the text as such being amended and indeed the amendments suggested would preclude the use of the simpli?ed revision procedure
-
or at the very least be subject to legal challenge on this ground.
Legal certainty is the main reason for amending treaty in the ?rst place, and anything that undermined that would be problematic.
As regards future treaty amendments, it is impossible to give any speci?c undertaking.
It has, however, been agreed that there will be an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of this framework in 2016, to be carried out by the European Commission.
This provision guarantees that any future evaluation - and possible suggestions for change - will in the ?rst instance come from the Commission.
Turning to
option b)
of the report, concerns to the effect that the European Stability Mechanism might provide the nucleus of a future intergovernmental secretariat to manage the Eurozone economy are unfounded.
The mechanism is for a speci?cally de?ned purpose.
Its staff will be entirely devoted to the ?nancial and treasury aspects of this mechanism and will not be involved in the wider issues of economic governance.
The ESM's role is to mobilise ?nance and provide ?nancial assistance, but the assessment of the need for ?nancial support and the de?nition of the conditionality will be done by the Commission.
Fears that the Commission may be excluded from the working of the mechanism can also be allayed.
The experience with the temporary mechanisms demonstrates that Commission involvement is not only possible, but essential.
Under the temporary mechanism, the conditionality measures regarding the recipient State was adopted using a Union procedure, i.e. a Decision adopted by the Council on a recommendation from the Commission based on Article 136 TFEU together with Article 126(9) TFEU (see Article 126 (13) which sets out the applicable procedure for decisions under Article 126 (9)).
This is the procedure which has been followed for adopting the conditionality measures for Greece (see Council Decision (2010/320/EU) of 10 May 2010 (OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p.
6) adopted on a recommendation from the Commission of 4 May 2010 (SEC(2010) 560 ?nal)).
Regarding the permanent Mechanism, already in the conclusions of the European Council of 16 and 17 December, in Annex II outlining the „General Features of the Future Mechanism”, Commission involvement is speci?ed explicitly a number of times.
Since then, the preparatory work carried out for the ESM has clari?ed that:
·
If a Member State requests ?nancial assistance, it is the Commission which will assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the ?nancial stability of the euro area as a whole and undertake an analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB).
·
If stability support is requested, it is the Commission (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) which will assess the actual ?nancing needs of the bene?ciary Member State and the nature of the required private sector involvement.
·
The Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned.
·
The Commission will propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the euro area Member States.
·
The Commission (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
·
After discussion in the Board of Governors, it is a proposal by the Commission that the Council can decide to implement post-programme surveillance.
·
The policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme should be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation clarifying the necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
·
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
·
In the eventuality of certain disputes arising, it is the EU Court that will be responsible in accordance with Art. 273 TFEU.
RESOLUTSIOONI III LISA
Eurorühma esimehe ja rahandusvoliniku kiri raportööridele
Brussels, 22 March 2011
Dear Mr Brok, Dear Mr Gualtieri,
We hereby wish to inform you of the outcome of the negotiations on the setting up of European Stability Mechanism, as this will be of importance for the European Parliament when it decides on its opinion on the draft amendment to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, based on your report.
An intergovernmental ministerial meeting ?nalised yesterday, 21 March, a Term Sheet on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
You will ?nd attached the ?nal text of this Term Sheet.
As you can see, according to the Term Sheet, the ESM will be established by a treaty among the euro-area Member States as an intergovernmental organisation under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg.
The ESM will have a Board of Governors consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro-area Member States (as voting members), with the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers.
Non euro area Member States can participate on an ad hoc basis alongside the ESM in ?nancial assistance operations for euro area Member States.
The role of the Commission in the running of operations of the ESM is central, and the link of the ESM with EU institutions clearly established.
As described in the Term Sheet, it will be for the Commission to assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the ?nancial stability of the euro area as a whole, and to undertake analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
Further it will be for the Commission to take the lead in assessing the actual ?nancing needs of the bene?ciary Member State, as well as the nature of the required private sector involvement.
On the basis of this assessment, the Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned, detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
It will be for the Commission to propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
The Board of Governors will decide on the granting of ?nancial assistance and the terms and conditions under which assistance is provided.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the MoU on behalf of the euro area Member States subject to prior mutual agreement by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Directors will then approve the ?nancial assistance agreement which would contain the technical aspects of the ?nancial assistance to be provided.
The Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
It will report to the Council and to the Board of Directors.
On the basis of this report, the Board of Directors will decide by mutual agreement on the disbursement of the new tranches of the loan.
After discussion in the Board of Governors, the Council can decide, on a proposal by the Commission, to implement post-programme surveillance, which can be maintained for as long as a speci?ed amount of the ?nancial assistance has not been repaid.
The policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme will be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures, and thereby also the role of the European Parliament.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council based on Article 136 of the Treaty, clarifying the necessary procedural steps in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
We trust this information will be helpful for the European Parliament for its consideration of the draft amendment to Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro.
Yours sincerely,
(signed) (signed)
Olli Rehn Jean-Claude Juncker
Member of the European Commission President of the Euro Group
Copies:
President of the European Parliament
President of the European Council
President of the European Commission
Eurorühma esimehe ja rahandusvoliniku raportööridele suunatud kirja lisa
21 March 2011
Term Sheet on the ESM
The European Council has agreed on the need for euro-area Member States to establish a permanent stability mechanism: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The ESM will be activated by mutual agreement A decision taken by mutual agreement is a decision taken by unanimity of the Member States participating to the vote, i.e. abstentions do not prevent the decision from being adopted.
, if indispensable to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
The ESM will assume the role of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) in providing external financial assistance to euro-area Member States after June 2013.
Access to ESM financial assistance will be provided on the basis of strict policy conditionality under a macro-economic adjustment programme and a rigorous analysis of public-debt sustainability, which will be conducted by the Commission together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
The beneficiary Member State will be required to put in place an appropriate form of private-sector involvement, according to the specific circumstances and in a manner fully consistent with IMF practices.
The ESM will have an effective lending capacity of € 500 billion During the transition from EFSF to ESM, the combined lending capacity will not exceed this amount.
.
The adequacy of the lending capacity will be reviewed on a regular basis and at least every five years.
The ESM will seek to supplement its lending capacity through the participation of the IMF in financial assistance operations, while non-euro area Member States may also participate on an ad hoc basis.
The remainder of this term sheet sets out the key structural features of the ESM:
Institutional form
The ESM will be established by a treaty among the euro-area Member States as an intergovernmental organisation under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg.
The statute of the ESM will be set out in an annex to the treaty.
Function and funding strategy
The function of the ESM will be to mobilise funding and provide financial assistance, under strict conditionality, to the benefit of euro-area Member States, which are experiencing or are threatened by severe financing problems, in order to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
The Member States of the euro area will give to the ESM the financial sanctions received under the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalances procedures Subject to a final agreement at political level.
.
Such sanctions will form part of the paid-in capital.
The ESM will use an appropriate funding strategy so as to ensure access to broad funding sources and enable it to extend financial assistance packages to Member States under all market conditions.
Any associated risk will be contained through adequate asset and liability management.
Governance
The ESM will have a Board of Governors consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro-area Member States (as voting members), with the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers.
The Board of Governors will elect a Chairperson from among its voting members.
The Board of Governors will be the highest decision-making body of the ESM and will take the following major decisions by mutual agreement:
–
the granting of financial assistance;
–
the terms and conditions of financial assistance;
–
the lending capacity of the ESM;
–
changes to the menu of instruments.
All other decisions by the Board of Governors will be taken by qualified majority, unless stated otherwise.
The ESM will have a Board of Directors, which will carry out specific tasks as delegated by the Board of Governors.
Each euro-area Member state will appoint one Director and one alternate Director.
In addition, the Commission and the ECB will each nominate an observer and an alternate to the Board of Directors.
All decisions by the Board of Directors will be taken by qualified majority, unless otherwise stated.
Voting weights within the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors will be proportional to the Member States' respective subscriptions to the capital of the ESM.
A qualified majority is defined as 80 percent of the votes.
The Board of Governors will appoint a Managing Director responsible for the day-to-day management of the ESM.
The Managing Director will chair the Board of Directors.
Capital structure
The ESM will aim to obtain and maintain the highest credit rating from the major credit rating agencies.
The ESM will have a total subscribed capital of € 700 billion.
Of this amount, € 80 billion will be in the form of paid-in capital provided by the euro-area Member States, of which € 40 billion will be available from July 2013 with the remaining share being phased in over the three following years.
In addition, the ESM will also dispose of a combination of committed callable capital and of guarantees from euro area Member States to a total amount of € 620 billion
.
The contribution key of each Member State in the total subscribed capital of the ESM will be based on the paid-in capital key of the ECB as annexed.
By ratifying the Treaty establishing the ESM, Member States legally commit to provide their contribution to the total subscribed capital.
The Board of Governors will decide by mutual agreement when adapting the amount of total subscribed capital or when calling capital, except in the specific cases described below.
First, the Board of Directors can decide, by simple majority, to restore -by calling in capital- the level of paid-in capital in the event that the amount of paid-in capital is reduced by the absorption of losses The vote of the Member State whose default is at the origin of the loss to be covered is suspended for this decision.
.
Second, an on-demand guarantee procedure will be put in place that allows calling in capital automatically from the shareholders of the ESM if needed to avoid a payment shortfall to the creditors of the ESM.
The liability of each shareholder will in all circumstances be limited to its share in the subscribed capital.
Any contribution to subscribed capital by a Member State As a consequence of joining the euro area, a Member State shall become a member of the ESM with full rights and obligations.
joining the ESM after July 2013 will be made according to the same terms applied for the original contributions.
The practical implications for the overall amount of subscribed capital and the distribution of capital among the Member States will be decided by the Board of Governors by mutual agreement.
As long as the ESM has not been activated and provided that the effective lending capacity is not less than 500 billion, the proceeds from the investment of the ESM paid-in capital will be returned to the Member States, after deductions for operational costs.
Following the first activation of the ESM, the proceeds from the investment of ESM capital and financial assistance activity will be retained within the ESM.
However, in the event that paid-in capital exceeds the level required to maintain the lending capacity of the ESM, the Board of Directors can decide, by simple majority to distribute a dividend to the euro-area Member States based on the contribution key.
Instruments
The ESM will provide financial assistance subject to strict conditionality under a macro-economic adjustment programme, commensurate with the severity of the imbalances of the Member State.
It will be provided through loans.
However, it may intervene, as an exception, in debt primary markets on the basis of a macro-economic adjustment programme with strict conditionality and if agreed by the Board of Governors by mutual agreement.
§ ESM stability support (ESS)
The ESM can grant short-term or medium term stability support to a euro-area Member State, which is experiencing severe financing problems.
Access to an ESS will imply a macroeconomic adjustment programme with adequate policy conditionality commensurate with the severity of the underlying imbalances in the beneficiary Member State.
The length of the programme and maturity of the loans will depend on the nature of the imbalances and the prospects of the beneficiary Member States regaining access to financial markets within the time that ESM resources are available.
·
Primary market support facility
The ESM can purchase the bonds of a Member State, which is experiencing severe financing problems, on the primary market, with the objective of maximizing the cost efficiency of the support.
Conditions and modalities under which bond purchasing would be conducted will be specified in the Decision on the terms and conditions of financial assistance.
The Board of Governors may review the instruments at the ESM's disposal and may decide to make changes to the menu of instruments.
IMF involvement
The ESM will cooperate very closely with the IMF in providing financial assistance It is however understood that any IMF involvement will be consistent with its mandate under the Articles of Agreement and by applicable decision and policies of the IMF Board.
.
In all circumstances, active participation of the IMF will be sought, both on the technical and the financial level.
The debt sustainability analysis will be jointly conducted by the Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB.
The policy conditions attached to a joint ESM/IMF assistance will be negotiated jointly by the Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB.
Activation of financial assistance, programme monitoring and follow-up
Financial assistance from the ESM will in all cases be activated on a request from a Member State to the other Members States of the euro area.
The Eurogroup will inform the Council that a request for activation of support has been made.
On receipt of such a request, the Board of Governors will ask the Commission to assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and to undertake a rigorous analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
The subsequent steps in the activation of ESM financial assistance will be as follows:
§ If an ESS is requested, the Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will assess the actual financing needs of the beneficiary Member State and the nature of the required private sector involvement, which should be consistent with IMF practices.
§ On the basis of this assessment, the Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned, detailed in a MoU.
§ The Commission will propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
The Board of Governors will decide on the granting of financial assistance and the terms and conditions under which assistance is provided.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the MoU on behalf of the euro area Member States subject to prior mutual agreement by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Directors will then approve the financial assistance agreement which would contain the technical aspects of the financial assistance to be provided.
§ The Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
It will report to the Council and to the Board of Directors.
On the basis of this report, the Board of Directors will decide by mutual agreement on the disbursement of the new tranches of the loan.
§ After discussion in the Board of Governors, the Council can decide, on a proposal by the Commission, to implement post-programme surveillance, which can be maintained for as long as a specified amount of the financial assistance has not been repaid.
Consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework
Approval by the EU Member States will be sought to allow the euro-area Member States to task the Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, the analysis of the debt sustainability of the Member State requesting financial support, the preparation of the adjustment programme accompanying the financial assistance, as well as with the monitoring of its implementation.
While the Board of Governors has the autonomy to decide on the existence and modalities of financial assistance under an intergovernmental framework, the policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme should be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation clarifying the necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
Pricing
The Board of Governors will decide on the pricing structure for financial assistance to a beneficiary Member State.
The ESM will be able to lend at a fixed or variable rate.
The pricing of the ESM will be in line with IMF pricing principles and, while remaining above the funding costs of ESM, will include an adequate mark up for risks.
The following pricing structure will apply to ESM loans:
1)
ESM funding cost
2)
A charge of 200 bps applied on the entire loans
3)
A surcharge of 100 bps for loan amounts outstanding after 3 years
For fixed rate loans with maturities above 3 years, the margin will be a weighted average of the charge of 200 bps for the first 3 years and 200 bps plus 100 bps for the following years.
The pricing structure will be defined in the pricing policy of the ESM, which will be reviewed periodically.
Private sector involvement
1.
Modalities for involving the private sector
An adequate and proportionate form of private-sector involvement will be expected in all cases where financial assistance is received by the beneficiary State.
The nature and extent of this involvement will be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the outcome of a debt sustainability analysis, in line with IMF practice In line with the IMF, debt is considered sustainable when a borrower is expected to be able to continue servicing its debts without an unrealistically large correction to its income and expenditure.
This judgement determines the availability and the appropriate scale of financing.
, and on potential implications for euro-area financial stability.
(a)
If, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macro-economic adjustment programme can realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path
, the beneficiary Member State will take initiatives aimed at encouraging the main private investors to maintain their exposures (e.g. a „Vienna Initiative” approach).
The Commission, the IMF, the ECB and the EBA will be closely involved in monitoring the implementation of such initiatives.
(b)
If, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macro-economic programme cannot realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path,
the beneficiary Member State will be required to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its creditors to secure their direct involvement in restoring debt sustainability.
The granting of the financial assistance will be contingent on the Member State having a credible plan and demonstrating sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and proportionate private sector involvement.
Progress in the implementation of the plan will be monitored under the programme and will be taken into account in the decision on disbursements.
In negotiating with creditors, the beneficiary Member State will adhere to the following principles:
o
Proportionality:
the Member State will seek solutions proportionate to its debt sustainability problem.
o
Transparency
: the Member State concerned will engage in an open dialogue with creditors and share relevant information with them on a timely basis.
o
Fairness:
the Member State will consult creditors on the design of any rescheduling or restructuring of public debt with a view to reaching negotiated solutions.
Measures reducing the net present value of the debt will be considered only when other options are unlikely to deliver the expected results.
o
Cross-border co-ordination:
the risk of contagion and potential spill over effects on other Member States and third countries will be duly taken into account in the design of measures to involve the private sector.
The measures taken will be accompanied with a proper communication by the Member State concerned aimed at preserving the financial stability of the Euro Area as a whole.
2.
Collective Action Clauses
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) will be included in all new euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, from July 2013.
The objective of such CACs will be to facilitate agreement between the sovereign and its private-sector creditors in the context of private sector involvement.
The inclusion of CACs in a bond will not imply a higher probability of default or of debt restructuring relating to that bond.
Accordingly, the creditor status of sovereign debt will not be affected by the inclusion of CACs.
The main features of the CACs will be consistent with those commonly used in the US and the UK markets since the G10 report on CACs.
CACs will be introduced in a way which preserves a level playing field among euro area Member States.
This implies the use of
identical and standardized clauses
for all euro area Member States, harmonized in the terms and conditions of securities issued by the Members States.
Their basis will be
consistent with the CACs that are common in New York and English law
.
CACs will include an
aggregation clause
, enabling a super majority of bondholders across multiple bond issues subject to such a clause and subject to the law of a single jurisdiction to include a majority action clause where the needed majority of creditors for the restructuration would not be attained within a single bond issue.
Appropriate representation
will be put in place.
Most important issues – the reserve matters – (e.g. key payment terms, conversion or exchange of bonds) will be decided with a larger
majority
than non-reserve matters.
Appropriate
quorum
requirements will apply.
Changes agreed by the relevant majorities are binding on all bondholders.
An appropriate
disenfranchisement
clause will apply to ensure a proper voting process.
Appropriate clauses to prevent disruptive legal action will be considered.
CACs will be introduced in a standardized manner, which ensures that their legal impact is identical in all euro-area jurisdictions and so preserves a level playing field among euro-area Member States.
The euro area Member States will adopt the necessary measures to give effect to the CACs.
Euro area Member States will be allowed to continue to „tap” outstanding debt without CACs under pre-determined conditions after June 2013 in order to preserve the necessary liquidity of old bonds and to give sufficient time to euro area Member States to create, in an orderly fashion, new bonds on all benchmark maturities.
The detailed legal arrangements for including CACs in euro-area government securities will be decided on the basis of work to be undertaken by the EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, following appropriate consultation with market participants and other stakeholders, and be finalised by the end of 2011.
3.
Preferred Creditor Status of the ESM
Like the IMF, the ESM will provide financial assistance to a Member State when its regular access to market financing is impaired.
Reflecting this, Heads of State or Government have stated that the ESM will enjoy preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to the IMF, while accepting preferred creditor status of IMF over ESM.
This shall be effective as of 1 July 2013 without prejudice to the terms and conditions of any other agreement provided under the EFSF and the Greek facility.
Transitional arrangements between EFSF and ESM
As originally foreseen, the EFSF will remain in place after June 2013 so as to administer the outstanding bonds.
It will remain operational until it has received full payment of the financing granted to the Member States and has repaid its liabilities under the financial instruments issued and any obligations to reimburse guarantors.
Undisbursed and unfunded portions of existing loan facilities should be transferred to the ESM (e.g. payment and financing of instalments that would become due only after the entry into force of ESM).
The consolidated EFSF and ESM lending shall not exceed € 500 bn.
To ensure a smooth transition from the EFSF to the ESM, the CEO of the EFSF will be tasked with the practical preparation of the establishment of the ESM.
He will regularly report on the progress made to the Eurogroup Working Group.
Participation of the non euro area Member States
Non euro area Member States can participate on an
ad hoc
basis alongside the ESM in financial assistance operations for euro area Member States.
If non-euro area Member States participate in such operations, they will be represented in the relevant meetings of the ESM boards that will decide on the granting and the monitoring of the assistance.
They will have access to all relevant information in a timely manner and be appropriately consulted.
The euro area Member States will support equivalent creditor status of the ESM and that of other Member States lending bilaterally alongside the ESM.
Dispute settlement
If a dispute arises between a euro area Member State and the ESM in connection with the interpretation and application of the treaty establishing the ESM, the Board of Governors will decide on this dispute.
If the Member State contests this decision, such dispute shall be submitted to the European Court of Justice in accordance with Art. 273 TFEU.
With regard to the relationship between the ESM and third parties, the applicable governing law and jurisdiction will be dealt with by the legal and contractual documentation which will then be put in place between the ESM and those third parties.
Annex
: ESM contribution key based on the ECB key
ESM contribution key
Country
ISO
ESM key
Austria
AT
2.783
Belgium
BE
3.477
Cyprus
CY
0.196
Estonia
EE
0.186
Finland
FI
1.797
France
FR
20.386
Germany
DE
27.146
Greece
EL
2.817
Ireland
IE
1.592
Italy
IT
17.914
Luxembourg
LU
0.250
Malta
MT
0.073
Netherlands
NL
5.717
Portugal
PT
2.509
Slovakia
SK
0.824
Slovenia
SI
0.428
Spain
ES
11.904
Total
EA17
100.0
Notes:
The ESM key is based on the ECB capital contribution key.
Member States with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the EU average will benefit from a temporary correction for a period of 12 years after their entry in the euro area.
This temporary correction will be three quarters of the difference between GNI and ECB capital shares (effectively comprising of 75% of GNI share and 25% of ECB capital share) as follows:
ESM share = ECB key share - 0,75*(ECB key share - GNI share)
The downwards compensation on those countries is redistributed among all the other countries according to their ECB key share.
GNI and GDP per capita in 2010.
Sources:
ECB, Ameco and DG ECFIN calculations.
