P7_TA-PROV(2011)0103
Zmena a doplnenie Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie v súvislosti s mechanizmom pre stabilitu pre členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro *
A7-0052/2011
Uznesenie Európskeho parlamentu z 23. marca 2011 o návrhu rozhodnutia Európskej rady, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa článok 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie v súvislosti s mechanizmom pre stabilitu pre členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro (00033/2010 – C7-0014/2011 – 2010/0821(NLE))
Európsky parlament
,
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so zreteľom na článok 48 ods. 6 a článok 48 ods. 2 Zmluvy o Európskej únii,
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so zreteľom na záverečnú správu pracovnej skupiny pre Európsku radu o posilnení hospodárskeho riadenia v EÚ,
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so zreteľom na návrh rozhodnutia Európskej rady, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa článok 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie, predložený Európskej rade 16. decembra 2010 (00033/2010 – C7-0014/2011 ),
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so zreteľom na listy predsedov Európskej rady a Euroskupiny a komisára zodpovedného za menovú politiku priložené k tomuto uzneseniu,
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so zreteľom na článok 74b rokovacieho poriadku,
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so zreteľom na list Výboru pre rozpočet z 18. februára 2011 adresovaný Výboru pre ústavné veci,
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so zreteľom na správu Výboru pre ústavné veci a na stanovisko Výboru pre hospodárske a menové veci ( A7-0052/2011 ),
A.
keďže článok 3 ods. 4 Zmluvy o EÚ stanovuje: „Únia vytvorí hospodársku a menovú úniu, ktorej menou je euro“,
B.
keďže Spojené kráľovstvo sa rozhodlo jednotnú menu neprijať,
C.
keďže podľa článku 3 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ je „menová politika pre členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro
,
“ výlučnou právomocou Únie,
D.
keďže v článku 5 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ sa uvádza: „Členské štáty koordinujú svoje hospodárske politiky v rámci Únie“, pričom na členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro, sa vzťahujú osobitné ustanovenia,
E.
keďže návrh rozhodnutia Európskej rady môže v prípade prijatia viesť k zavedeniu mechanizmu úplne mimo dosahu Únie, pričom inštitúciám Únie ako takým nebude v rámci neho priradená žiadna úloha,
F.
keďže je potrebné v plnej miere a trvale zabezpečiť budúcu účasť inštitúcií Únie na novom európskom mechanizme pre stabilitu a vytvoriť prepojenie pre možné zásahy v systéme záruk v rámci rozpočtu Únie,
G.
keďže je potrebné preskúmať všetky možnosti úplného zavedenia európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu do inštitucionálneho rámca Únie a zabezpečiť zapojenie do tohto mechanizmu pre tie členské štáty, ktorých menou nie je euro; keďže to môže zahŕňať uplatnenie článku 20 Zmluvy o EÚ o posilnenej spolupráci tam, kde to je vhodné, s cieľom zabezpečiť konzistenciu hospodárskej politiky Únie,
H.
keďže pravidlá, ktorými sa riadi európsky mechanizmus pre stabilitu, by mala pokiaľ možno navrhovať Komisia a mali by zabezpečovať vhodné opatrenia v oblasti kontroly, zodpovednosti a transparentnosti,
I.
keďže európsky mechanizmus pre stabilitu by mali sprevádzať posilnené preventívne a nápravné opatrenia Paktu stability a rastu a opatrenia týkajúce sa strednodobej a dlhodobej konkurencieschopnosti a riešenia makroekonomických nerovnováh medzi členskými štátmi,
J.
keďže Únia by mala okrem zavedenia európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu presadzovať konsolidovaný trh s eurobondmi,
K.
keďže Komisia by mala predložiť návrhy právnych predpisov a v prípade potreby aj revízie zmluvy s cieľom vytvoriť pre Úniu a najmä pre eurozónu v strednodobom horizonte systém hospodárskej vlády, ktorým by sa posilnila súdržnosť a konkurencieschopnosť hospodárstva a stabilizoval by sa finančný systém,
L.
keďže článok 48 ods. 6 Zmluvy o EÚ Európskej rade umožňuje, aby po porade s Európskym parlamentom prijala rozhodnutie, ktorým sa menia a dopĺňajú všetky alebo niektoré ustanovenia tretej časti Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ bez toho, aby sa tým narušila rovnováha právomocí medzi Úniou a jej členskými štátmi,
M.
keďže akékoľvek posilnenie alebo oslabenie právomocí Únie by si vyžadovalo riadny revízny postup,
N.
keďže každú ďalšiu revíziu Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ je potrebné vykonať v rámci riadneho revízneho postupu,
O.
keďže navrhnuté rozhodnutie nenadobudne účinnosť, kým ho neschvália členské štáty v súlade so svojimi príslušnými ústavnými požiadavkami,
1.
zdôrazňuje, že menová politika pre členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro, je výlučnou právomocou Únie a je politikou Spoločenstva už od Maastrichtskej zmluvy;
2.
zdôrazňuje dôležitosť eura pre európsky politický a hospodársky projekt a vyzdvihuje dôležitosť záväzku, ktorý všetky členské štáty prijali v prospech stability eurozóny, a zmysel pre zodpovednosť a solidaritu, ktorý preukázali;
3.
zdôrazňuje, že európsky mechanizmus pre stabilitu tvorí dôležitú súčasť globálneho balíka opatrení navrhnutých na vymedzenie nového rámca, pričom posilňuje rozpočtovú disciplínu a koordináciu hospodárskych a finančných politík členských štátov, ktoré by mali zahŕňať presadzovanie spoločnej odpovede Európskej únie na problémy rastu, a tým prekonáva hospodárske a sociálne nerovnováhy a zlepšuje konkurencieschopnosť;
4.
poznamenáva, že Rada nevyužila všetky možnosti poskytované v zmluvách na úplné presadenie Paktu stability a rastu a zlepšenie hospodárskej koordinácie na úrovni Európskej únie;
5.
domnieva sa, že je nevyhnutné urobiť viac, než len pripraviť dočasné opatrenia zamerané na stabilizáciu eurozóny, a že Únia by mala posilňovať správu ekonomických záležitostí aj prostredníctvom politík a nástrojov určených na podporu udržateľného rastu v členských štátoch; zastáva názor, že posilnenie Paktu stability a rastu, európsky semester, stratégia EÚ 2020 a zmena a doplnenie článku 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ týkajúce sa európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu sú len prvým krokom v tomto smere;
6.
zdôrazňuje, že európsky mechanizmus pre stabilitu a prísna podmienenosť, ktorá je v ňom obsiahnutá, zahŕňa všetky členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro, vrátane tých menších, ktorých hospodárstvo sa na účely zachovania eurozóny ako celku nemusí zdať „nenahraditeľné“;
7.
varuje pred úmyslom vytvoriť trvalý mechanizmus pre stabilitu mimo inštitucionálneho rámca EÚ, pretože by to mohlo ohroziť integritu systému založeného na zmluvách; domnieva sa, že Komisia musí byť členom správnej rady tohto mechanizmu, a nielen jednoduchým pozorovateľom; okrem toho sa domnieva, že v tejto súvislosti by Komisia mala byť oprávnená prijímať primerané iniciatívy s cieľom dosiahnuť so súhlasom príslušných členských štátov ciele európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu; zdôrazňuje, že členské štáty musia za každých okolností dodržiavať právo Únie a výsady inštitúcií, ktoré sú v nich stanovené;
8.
zdôrazňuje, že vytvorenie a fungovanie trvalého mechanizmu pre stabilitu musí plne rešpektovať základné zásady demokratického rozhodovania, akými sú transparentnosť, parlamentná kontrola a demokratická zodpovednosť; zdôrazňuje, že do európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu by mali byť úzko zapojené inštitúcie a orgány Únie zodpovedné za menové otázky – Európska komisia, Európska centrálna banka (ECB) a Európska investičná banka; podčiarkuje, že mechanizmus nesmie viesť ku vzniku nového modelu európskej správy, ktorá by nespĺňala úroveň demokratických noriem dosiahnutých v Únii;
9.
s poľutovaním konštatuje, že Európska rada nevyužila všetky možnosti poskytované v zmluvách na vytvorenie trvalého mechanizmu pre stabilitu; domnieva sa najmä, že v rámci súčasných právomocí Únie v oblasti hospodárskej a menovej únie (článok 3 ods. 4 Zmluvy o EÚ) a menovej politiky členských štátov, ktorých menou je euro (článok 3 ods. 1 písm. c) Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ), by bolo vhodné využiť právomoci zverené Rade v článku 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ, alebo alternatívne využiť článok 352 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ v spojení s článkami 133 a 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ;
10.
vyzýva Komisiu, aby preskúmala aj iné mechanizmy, ktorými by sa zabezpečila finančná stabilita a udržateľný a primeraný hospodársky rast eurozóny, a aby pripravila potrebné legislatívne návrhy; zdôrazňuje, že je potrebné, aby európsky mechanizmus pre stabilitu zahŕňal opatrenia na zníženie rizík pre finančnú, hospodársku a sociálnu stabilitu vrátane účinnej regulácie finančných trhov, revízie Paktu stability a rastu a lepšej hospodárskej koordinácie, zavedenia nástrojov na zníženie makroekonomických nerovnováh v rámci eurozóny a opatrení zameraných na ekologickú obnovu;
11.
okrem toho sa domnieva, že zriadenie a fungovanie trvalého mechanizmu pre stabilitu by sa malo uskutočňovať v rámci Európskej únie, aj analogickým využívaním inštitucionálneho mechanizmu posilnenej spolupráce ako nástroja na zapojenie inštitúcií Únie vo všetkých fázach a podporou účasti tých členských štátov, ktorých menou ešte nie je euro, na európskom mechanizme pre stabilitu;
12.
poznamenáva, že na základe diskusií v Európskom parlamente sa vedúci predstavitelia štátov a vlád eurozóny na stretnutí 11. marca 2011 v súvislosti s paktom pre euro zhodli na tom, že Komisia by mala zohrávať významnú ústrednú úlohu pri monitorovaní realizácie záväzkov, najmä s cieľom zabezpečiť, aby opatrenia boli zlučiteľné s pravidlami EÚ a podporovali ich a aby boli v súlade so zapojením Európskeho parlamentu; konštatuje, že pri posúdení všeobecných prvkov európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu sa dohodli na tom, že pomoc poskytovaná členskému štátu, ktorého menou je euro, bude založená na prísnom programe úpravy hospodárskej a rozpočtovej politiky a na prísnej analýze udržateľnosti dlhovej služby, ktorú vypracuje Komisia a Medzinárodný menový fond (MMF) v spolupráci s ECB;
13.
uznáva pozitívne signály prejavené v listoch predsedov Európskej rady a Euroskupiny a komisára zodpovedného za menovú politiku; berie na vedomie, že:
–
politická podmienenosť zavedená v rámci posilneného dohľadu alebo programu úpravy v makroekonomickej oblasti budú vymedzené nariadením, ktoré navrhne Komisia podľa článku 136 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ, aby sa zabezpečil súlad s mnohostranným rámcom dohľadu EÚ;
–
prístup k finančnej pomoci v rámci európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu sa poskytuje na základe prísnej analýzy udržateľnosti verejného dlhu, ktorú vypracuje Komisia spolu s MMF v spolupráci s ECB; a zavedie sa prísna politická podmienenosť v rámci programu úpravy v makroekonomickej oblasti, ktorá bude zodpovedať závažnosti nerovnováhy v príslušnom členskom štáte;
–
na základe posúdenia potreby poskytnutia finančnej pomoci prijímajúcim členským štátom, ktoré vypracuje Komisia a MMF v spolupráci s ECB, poverí rada guvernérov európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu Komisiu, aby spolu s MMF a v spolupráci s ECB začala rokovania o programe úpravy v makroekonomickej oblasti s príslušným členským štátom;
–
Komisia navrhne Rade prijať rozhodnutie o schválení makroekonomického programu a po jeho prijatí podpíše memorandum o porozumení v mene členských štátov, ktorých menou je euro;
–
politická podmienenosť zavedená v rámci posilneného dohľadu alebo programu úpravy v makroekonomickej oblasti sa zosúladí s rámcom dohľadu Európskej únie a musí zaručiť súlad s postupmi EÚ;
–
finančná pomoc sa bude aktivovať na žiadosť členského štátu potom, ako Komisia v spolupráci s ECB posúdi, či existuje riziko ohrozenia finančnej stability eurozóny ako celku;
–
Komisia spoločne s MMF a v spolupráci s ECB bude zodpovedná za monitorovanie dodržiavania politickej podmienenosti a bude podávať správy Rade a správnej rade;
–
po diskusii v rade guvernérov prijme Rada rozhodnutie zrealizovať dohľad po ukončení programu na základe návrhu predloženého Komisiou;
–
Rada a Komisia budú pravidelne informovať Európsky parlament o zriadení a fungovaní európskeho mechanizmu pre stabilitu, a tak bude v pozícii, ktorá mu umožní riadne kontrolovať jeho činnosť;
–
v prípade akéhokoľvek sporu bude príslušný Súdny dvor Európskej únie v súlade s článkom 273 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ;
14.
schvaľuje návrh rozhodnutia Európskej rady bez ohľadu na výhradu, že by bolo vhodnejšie pripraviť návrh tak, ako sa uvádza v prílohe I k tomuto uzneseniu; súhlasí s názorom vyjadreným v stanovisku ECB, ktorý podporuje uplatnenie metódy Únie, čím umožňuje európskemu mechanizmu pre stabilitu stať sa mechanizmom Únie v primeranom čase; vyzýva Európsku radu, aby zabezpečila, že:
–
nariadenie upravujúce politickú podmienenosť bude prijaté v súlade s riadnym legislatívnym postupom Únie;
–
každý členský štát, ktorého menou je euro a ktorý prispieva do trvalého mechanizmu pre stabilitu, bude mať k nemu prístup bez ohľadu na svoju veľkosť;
15.
pripomína, že budúci trvalý mechanizmus pre stabilitu by mal využívať inštitúcie Únie, keďže tým sa dá vyhnúť vzniku dvojitých štruktúr, ktoré by ohrozovali európsku integráciu;
16.
žiada, aby podmienky poskytovania úverov, ktoré sa majú uplatňovať pri splácaní finančných prostriedkov do trvalého mechanizmu pre stabilitu v prípade, že bude aktivovaný, boli podobné podmienkam, ktoré sa uplatňujú pri nástroji platobnej bilancie a nástroji makrofinančnej pomoci, ktoré používa Komisia, t. j. prísne sprostredkovane (back-to-back) bez marže nad nákladmi na prijaté úvery a pôžičky; ďalej sa domnieva, že úrokové miery, ktoré má používať trvalý mechanizmus pre stabilitu, by sa mali ponúkať za výhodných podmienok;
17.
trvá na tom, že dodržiavanie hospodárskych usmernení stanovených Komisiou a podmienok zavedených európskym mechanizmom pre stabilitu zo strany členských štátov musí kontrolovať Európsky parlament, a zdôrazňuje plné zapojenie všetkých národných parlamentov v súlade s ich rozpočtovými a kontrolnými právami vo všetkých fázach, najmä v kontexte európskeho semestra, s cieľom zvýšiť transparentnosť, iniciatíva a zodpovednosť za každé prijaté rozhodnutie;
18.
súhlasí so zámerom Komisie „zabezpečiť konzistenciu medzi budúcim mechanizmom a správou ekonomických záležitostí Únie, a to najmä v eurozóne, pričom sa budú rešpektovať právomoci prenesené na Úniu a jej inštitúcie prostredníctvom zmluvy“;
19.
zdôrazňuje, že návrhom rozhodnutia Európskej rady v znení zmien a doplnení sa nezvýšia právomoci Únie, ktoré zostanú na úrovni zjednodušeného revízneho postupu podľa zmluvy; poznamenáva však, že týmto rozhodnutím sa nemôžu znížiť právomoci inštitúcií Únie v oblasti hospodárskej a menovej politiky a menovej politiky členských štátov, ktorých menou je euro, a v žiadnom prípade sa ním nemôže predurčovať správne uplatňovanie práva Únie, a to najmä článkov 122 a 143 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ, a
acquis
Únie;
20.
opätovne potvrdzuje, že využívanie článku 48 ods. 6 Zmluvy o EÚ je výnimočným postupom, a pripomína právo Európskeho parlamentu podľa článku 48 ods. 3 Zmluvy o EÚ zvolať konvent s cieľom zreorganizovať inštitúcie, postupy a politiky, ktoré tvoria správu ekonomických záležitostí Únie;
21.
poveruje svojho predsedu, aby postúpil toto uznesenie Európskej rade, Rade, Komisii a Európskej centrálnej banke ako stanovisko Európskeho parlamentu podľa článku 48 ods. 6 druhého pododseku Zmluvy o EÚ.
PRÍLOHA I K UZNESENIU
Pozmeňujúci a doplňujúci návrh k článku 1 návrhu rozhodnutia Európskej rady
Do
článku 136 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní EÚ
sa dopĺňajú tieto
pododseky
:
Na základe odporúčania Komisie a po porade s Európskym parlamentom môžu
členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro, vytvoriť mechanizmus pre stabilitu, ktorý sa má v nevyhnutných prípadoch aktivovať na zabezpečenie stability eurozóny.
O poskytnutí
akejkoľvek požadovanej finančnej pomoci v rámci mechanizmu
sa rozhodne na základe návrhu Komisie a podľa prísnych kritérií
podmienenosti
v súlade so zásadami a cieľmi Únie, ako sú stanovené v Zmluve o Európskej únii a v tejto zmluve
.
Zásady a pravidlá podmienenosti finančnej pomoci v rámci mechanizmu a jeho kontroly sa stanovia v nariadení prijatom v súlade s riadnym legislatívnym postupom.
Článok 136 ods. 2 sa nahrádza takto:
2.
Na hlasovaní o opatreniach uvedených v
odseku 1 písm. a) a b)
sa zúčastňujú len členovia Rady zastupujúci členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro.
Kvalifikovaná väčšina uvedených členov je vymedzená v súlade s článkom 238 ods. 3 písm. a).
Na hlasovaní o opatreniach uvedených v treťom pododseku odseku 1 sa zúčastňujú len členovia Rady zastupujúci členské štáty, ktorých menou je euro.
PRÍLOHA II K UZNESENIU
List predsedu Európskej rady spravodajcom
Brussels, 22 March 2011
Dear Mr Brok, Dear Mr Gualtieri,
Following your various meetings and discussions with myself and members of my cabinet about the proposed amendment to Article 136 of the Treaty with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, allow me send you the attached paper, drawn up by my cabinet, which examines and responds to the concerns you expressed.
Mr Juncker, President of the Euro Group, and Mr Ollie Rehn, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, are writing to you separately on the outcome of the negotiations on the detail of the future Mechanism, which I fully endorse.
I am sure that you will agree that all this should give Parliament a broad level of satisfaction with regard to the points laid out in option b) of your report.
As you know, this treaty amendment is coming before the 24-25 March European Council.
You will appreciate the importance and urgency of this matter.
Yours sincerely
(signed)
Herman Van Rompuy
Annex
Concerning
option a)
in paragraph 12 of the report, which proposes to redraft the treaty amendment, it should be pointed out that this draft treaty amendment has been very carefully drawn up to make it acceptable to all Member States, which must all ratify it.
There is virtually no prospect of the text as such being amended and indeed the amendments suggested would preclude the use of the simpli?ed revision procedure
-
or at the very least be subject to legal challenge on this ground.
Legal certainty is the main reason for amending treaty in the ?rst place, and anything that undermined that would be problematic.
As regards future treaty amendments, it is impossible to give any speci?c undertaking.
It has, however, been agreed that there will be an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of this framework in 2016, to be carried out by the European Commission.
This provision guarantees that any future evaluation - and possible suggestions for change - will in the ?rst instance come from the Commission.
Turning to
option b)
of the report, concerns to the effect that the European Stability Mechanism might provide the nucleus of a future intergovernmental secretariat to manage the Eurozone economy are unfounded.
The mechanism is for a speci?cally de?ned purpose.
Its staff will be entirely devoted to the ?nancial and treasury aspects of this mechanism and will not be involved in the wider issues of economic governance.
The ESM's role is to mobilise ?nance and provide ?nancial assistance, but the assessment of the need for ?nancial support and the de?nition of the conditionality will be done by the Commission.
Fears that the Commission may be excluded from the working of the mechanism can also be allayed.
The experience with the temporary mechanisms demonstrates that Commission involvement is not only possible, but essential.
Under the temporary mechanism, the conditionality measures regarding the recipient State was adopted using a Union procedure, i.e. a Decision adopted by the Council on a recommendation from the Commission based on Article 136 TFEU together with Article 126(9) TFEU (see Article 126 (13) which sets out the applicable procedure for decisions under Article 126 (9)).
This is the procedure which has been followed for adopting the conditionality measures for Greece (see Council Decision (2010/320/EU) of 10 May 2010 (OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p.
6) adopted on a recommendation from the Commission of 4 May 2010 (SEC(2010) 560 ?nal)).
Regarding the permanent Mechanism, already in the conclusions of the European Council of 16 and 17 December, in Annex II outlining the „General Features of the Future Mechanism“, Commission involvement is speci?ed explicitly a number of times.
Since then, the preparatory work carried out for the ESM has clari?ed that:
·
If a Member State requests ?nancial assistance, it is the Commission which will assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the ?nancial stability of the euro area as a whole and undertake an analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB).
·
If stability support is requested, it is the Commission (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) which will assess the actual ?nancing needs of the bene?ciary Member State and the nature of the required private sector involvement.
·
The Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned.
·
The Commission will propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the euro area Member States.
·
The Commission (together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB) will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
·
After discussion in the Board of Governors, it is a proposal by the Commission that the Council can decide to implement post-programme surveillance.
·
The policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme should be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation clarifying the necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
·
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
·
In the eventuality of certain disputes arising, it is the EU Court that will be responsible in accordance with Art.
273 TFEU.
PRÍLOHA III K UZNESENIU
List predsedu Euroskupiny a komisára zodpovedného za menovú politiku spravodajcom
Brussels, 22 March 2011
Dear Mr Brok, Dear Mr Gualtieri,
We hereby wish to inform you of the outcome of the negotiations on the setting up of European Stability Mechanism, as this will be of importance for the European Parliament when it decides on its opinion on the draft amendment to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, based on your report.
An intergovernmental ministerial meeting ?nalised yesterday, 21 March, a Term Sheet on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
You will ?nd attached the ?nal text of this Term Sheet.
As you can see, according to the Term Sheet, the ESM will be established by a treaty among the euro-area Member States as an intergovernmental organisation under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg.
The ESM will have a Board of Governors consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro-area Member States (as voting members), with the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers.
Non euro area Member States can participate on an ad hoc basis alongside the ESM in ?nancial assistance operations for euro area Member States.
The role of the Commission in the running of operations of the ESM is central, and the link of the ESM with EU institutions clearly established.
As described in the Term Sheet, it will be for the Commission to assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the ?nancial stability of the euro area as a whole, and to undertake analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
Further it will be for the Commission to take the lead in assessing the actual ?nancing needs of the bene?ciary Member State, as well as the nature of the required private sector involvement.
On the basis of this assessment, the Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned, detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
It will be for the Commission to propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
The Board of Governors will decide on the granting of ?nancial assistance and the terms and conditions under which assistance is provided.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the MoU on behalf of the euro area Member States subject to prior mutual agreement by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Directors will then approve the ?nancial assistance agreement which would contain the technical aspects of the ?nancial assistance to be provided.
The Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
It will report to the Council and to the Board of Directors.
On the basis of this report, the Board of Directors will decide by mutual agreement on the disbursement of the new tranches of the loan.
After discussion in the Board of Governors, the Council can decide, on a proposal by the Commission, to implement post-programme surveillance, which can be maintained for as long as a speci?ed amount of the ?nancial assistance has not been repaid.
The policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme will be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures, and thereby also the role of the European Parliament.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council based on Article 136 of the Treaty, clarifying the necessary procedural steps in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
We trust this information will be helpful for the European Parliament for its consideration of the draft amendment to Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro.
Yours sincerely,
(signed)
(signed)
Olli Rehn Jean-Claude Juncker
Member of the European Commission President of the Euro Group
Copies:
President of the European Parliament
President of the European Council
President of the European Commission
Príloha k listu predsedu Euroskupiny a komisára zodpovedného za menovú politiku spravodajcom
21 March 2011
Term Sheet on the ESM
The European Council has agreed on the need for euro-area Member States to establish a permanent stability mechanism: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The ESM will be activated by mutual agreement A decision taken by mutual agreement is a decision taken by unanimity of the Member States participating to the vote, i.e. abstentions do not prevent the decision from being adopted.
, if indispensable to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
The ESM will assume the role of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) in providing external financial assistance to euro-area Member States after June 2013.
Access to ESM financial assistance will be provided on the basis of strict policy conditionality under a macro-economic adjustment programme and a rigorous analysis of public-debt sustainability, which will be conducted by the Commission together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
The beneficiary Member State will be required to put in place an appropriate form of private-sector involvement, according to the specific circumstances and in a manner fully consistent with IMF practices.
The ESM will have an effective lending capacity of € 500 billion During the transition from EFSF to ESM, the combined lending capacity will not exceed this amount.
.
The adequacy of the lending capacity will be reviewed on a regular basis and at least every five years.
The ESM will seek to supplement its lending capacity through the participation of the IMF in financial assistance operations, while non-euro area Member States may also participate on an ad hoc basis.
The remainder of this term sheet sets out the key structural features of the ESM:
Institutional form
The ESM will be established by a treaty among the euro-area Member States as an intergovernmental organisation under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg.
The statute of the ESM will be set out in an annex to the treaty.
Function and funding strategy
The function of the ESM will be to mobilise funding and provide financial assistance, under strict conditionality, to the benefit of euro-area Member States, which are experiencing or are threatened by severe financing problems, in order to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
The Member States of the euro area will give to the ESM the financial sanctions received under the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalances procedures Subject to a final agreement at political level.
.
Such sanctions will form part of the paid-in capital.
The ESM will use an appropriate funding strategy so as to ensure access to broad funding sources and enable it to extend financial assistance packages to Member States under all market conditions.
Any associated risk will be contained through adequate asset and liability management.
Governance
The ESM will have a Board of Governors consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro-area Member States (as voting members), with the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers.
The Board of Governors will elect a Chairperson from among its voting members.
The Board of Governors will be the highest decision-making body of the ESM and will take the following major decisions by mutual agreement:
–
the granting of financial assistance;
–
the terms and conditions of financial assistance;
–
the lending capacity of the ESM;
- changes to the menu of instruments.
All other decisions by the Board of Governors will be taken by qualified majority, unless stated otherwise.
The ESM will have a Board of Directors, which will carry out specific tasks as delegated by the Board of Governors.
Each euro-area Member state will appoint one Director and one alternate Director.
In addition, the Commission and the ECB will each nominate an observer and an alternate to the Board of Directors.
All decisions by the Board of Directors will be taken by qualified majority, unless otherwise stated.
Voting weights within the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors will be proportional to the Member States' respective subscriptions to the capital of the ESM.
A qualified majority is defined as 80 percent of the votes.
The Board of Governors will appoint a Managing Director responsible for the day-to-day management of the ESM.
The Managing Director will chair the Board of Directors.
Capital structure
The ESM will aim to obtain and maintain the highest credit rating from the major credit rating agencies.
The ESM will have a total subscribed capital of € 700 billion.
Of this amount, € 80 billion will be in the form of paid-in capital provided by the euro-area Member States, of which € 40 billion will be available from July 2013 with the remaining share being phased in over the three following years.
In addition, the ESM will also dispose of a combination of committed callable capital and of guarantees from euro area Member States to a total amount of € 620 billion
.
The contribution key of each Member State in the total subscribed capital of the ESM will be based on the paid-in capital key of the ECB as annexed.
By ratifying the Treaty establishing the ESM, Member States legally commit to provide their contribution to the total subscribed capital.
The Board of Governors will decide by mutual agreement when adapting the amount of total subscribed capital or when calling capital, except in the specific cases described below.
First, the Board of Directors can decide, by simple majority, to restore -by calling in capital- the level of paid-in capital in the event that the amount of paid-in capital is reduced by the absorption of losses The vote of the Member State whose default is at the origin of the loss to be covered is suspended for this decision.
.
Second, an on-demand guarantee procedure will be put in place that allows calling in capital automatically from the shareholders of the ESM if needed to avoid a payment shortfall to the creditors of the ESM.
The liability of each shareholder will in all circumstances be limited to its share in the subscribed capital.
Any contribution to subscribed capital by a Member State As a consequence of joining the euro area, a Member State shall become a member of the ESM with full rights and obligations.
joining the ESM after July 2013 will be made according to the same terms applied for the original contributions.
The practical implications for the overall amount of subscribed capital and the distribution of capital among the Member States will be decided by the Board of Governors by mutual agreement.
As long as the ESM has not been activated and provided that the effective lending capacity is not less than 500 billion, the proceeds from the investment of the ESM paid-in capital will be returned to the Member States, after deductions for operational costs.
Following the first activation of the ESM, the proceeds from the investment of ESM capital and financial assistance activity will be retained within the ESM.
However, in the event that paid-in capital exceeds the level required to maintain the lending capacity of the ESM, the Board of Directors can decide, by simple majority to distribute a dividend to the euro-area Member States based on the contribution key.
Instruments
The ESM will provide financial assistance subject to strict conditionality under a macro-economic adjustment programme, commensurate with the severity of the imbalances of the Member State.
It will be provided through loans.
However, it may intervene, as an exception, in debt primary markets on the basis of a macro-economic adjustment programme with strict conditionality and if agreed by the Board of Governors by mutual agreement.
§ ESM stability support (ESS)
The ESM can grant short-term or medium term stability support to a euro-area Member State, which is experiencing severe financing problems.
Access to an ESS will imply a macroeconomic adjustment programme with adequate policy conditionality commensurate with the severity of the underlying imbalances in the beneficiary Member State.
The length of the programme and maturity of the loans will depend on the nature of the imbalances and the prospects of the beneficiary Member States regaining access to financial markets within the time that ESM resources are available.
·
Primary market support facility
The ESM can purchase the bonds of a Member State, which is experiencing severe financing problems, on the primary market, with the objective of maximizing the cost efficiency of the support.
Conditions and modalities under which bond purchasing would be conducted will be specified in the Decision on the terms and conditions of financial assistance.
The Board of Governors may review the instruments at the ESM's disposal and may decide to make changes to the menu of instruments.
IMF involvement
The ESM will cooperate very closely with the IMF in providing financial assistance It is however understood that any IMF involvement will be consistent with its mandate under the Articles of Agreement and by applicable decision and policies of the IMF Board.
.
In all circumstances, active participation of the IMF will be sought, both on the technical and the financial level.
The debt sustainability analysis will be jointly conducted by the Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB.
The policy conditions attached to a joint ESM/IMF assistance will be negotiated jointly by the Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB.
Activation of financial assistance, programme monitoring and follow-up
Financial assistance from the ESM will in all cases be activated on a request from a Member State to the other Members States of the euro area.
The Eurogroup will inform the Council that a request for activation of support has been made.
On receipt of such a request, the Board of Governors will ask the Commission to assess, in liaison with the ECB, the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and to undertake a rigorous analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the Member State concerned, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB.
The subsequent steps in the activation of ESM financial assistance will be as follows:
§ If an ESS is requested, the Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will assess the actual financing needs of the beneficiary Member State and the nature of the required private sector involvement, which should be consistent with IMF practices.
§ On the basis of this assessment, the Board of Governors will mandate the Commission to negotiate, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, a macro-economic adjustment programme with the Member State concerned, detailed in a MoU.
§ The Commission will propose to the Council a decision endorsing the macro-economic adjustment programme.
The Board of Governors will decide on the granting of financial assistance and the terms and conditions under which assistance is provided.
When the programme has been adopted by the Council, the Commission will sign the MoU on behalf of the euro area Member States subject to prior mutual agreement by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Directors will then approve the financial assistance agreement which would contain the technical aspects of the financial assistance to be provided.
§ The Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policy conditionality required by a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
It will report to the Council and to the Board of Directors.
On the basis of this report, the Board of Directors will decide by mutual agreement on the disbursement of the new tranches of the loan.
§ After discussion in the Board of Governors, the Council can decide, on a proposal by the Commission, to implement post-programme surveillance, which can be maintained for as long as a specified amount of the financial assistance has not been repaid.
Consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework
Approval by the EU Member States will be sought to allow the euro-area Member States to task the Commission, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, the analysis of the debt sustainability of the Member State requesting financial support, the preparation of the adjustment programme accompanying the financial assistance, as well as with the monitoring of its implementation.
While the Board of Governors has the autonomy to decide on the existence and modalities of financial assistance under an intergovernmental framework, the policy conditionality established under an enhanced surveillance or a macroeconomic adjustment programme should be consistent with the EU surveillance framework and must guarantee the respect of EU procedures.
To this end, the Commission intends to propose a Regulation clarifying the necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral surveillance framework.
The Council and the Commission will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.
Pricing
The Board of Governors will decide on the pricing structure for financial assistance to a beneficiary Member State.
The ESM will be able to lend at a fixed or variable rate.
The pricing of the ESM will be in line with IMF pricing principles and, while remaining above the funding costs of ESM, will include an adequate mark up for risks.
The following pricing structure will apply to ESM loans:
1)
ESM funding cost
2)
A charge of 200 bps applied on the entire loans
3)
A surcharge of 100 bps for loan amounts outstanding after 3 years
For fixed rate loans with maturities above 3 years, the margin will be a weighted average of the charge of 200 bps for the first 3 years and 200 bps plus 100 bps for the following years.
The pricing structure will be defined in the pricing policy of the ESM, which will be reviewed periodically.
Private sector involvement
1.
Modalities for involving the private sector
An adequate and proportionate form of private-sector involvement will be expected in all cases where financial assistance is received by the beneficiary State.
The nature and extent of this involvement will be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the outcome of a debt sustainability analysis, in line with IMF practice In line with the IMF, debt is considered sustainable when a borrower is expected to be able to continue servicing its debts without an unrealistically large correction to its income and expenditure.
This judgement determines the availability and the appropriate scale of financing.
, and on potential implications for euro-area financial stability.
(a)
If, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macro-economic adjustment programme can realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path
, the beneficiary Member State will take initiatives aimed at encouraging the main private investors to maintain their exposures (e.g. a „Vienna Initiative“ approach).
The Commission, the IMF, the ECB and the EBA will be closely involved in monitoring the implementation of such initiatives.
(b)
If, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macro-economic programme cannot realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path,
the beneficiary Member State will be required to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its creditors to secure their direct involvement in restoring debt sustainability.
The granting of the financial assistance will be contingent on the Member State having a credible plan and demonstrating sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and proportionate private sector involvement.
Progress in the implementation of the plan will be monitored under the programme and will be taken into account in the decision on disbursements.
In negotiating with creditors, the beneficiary Member State will adhere to the following principles:
o
Proportionality:
the Member State will seek solutions proportionate to its debt sustainability problem.
o
Transparency
: the Member State concerned will engage in an open dialogue with creditors and share relevant information with them on a timely basis.
o
Fairness:
the Member State will consult creditors on the design of any rescheduling or restructuring of public debt with a view to reaching negotiated solutions.
Measures reducing the net present value of the debt will be considered only when other options are unlikely to deliver the expected results.
o
Cross-border co-ordination:
the risk of contagion and potential spill over effects on other Member States and third countries will be duly taken into account in the design of measures to involve the private sector.
The measures taken will be accompanied with a proper communication by the Member State concerned aimed at preserving the financial stability of the Euro Area as a whole.
2.
Collective Action Clauses
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) will be included in all new euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, from July 2013.
The objective of such CACs will be to facilitate agreement between the sovereign and its private-sector creditors in the context of private sector involvement.
The inclusion of CACs in a bond will not imply a higher probability of default or of debt restructuring relating to that bond.
Accordingly, the creditor status of sovereign debt will not be affected by the inclusion of CACs.
The main features of the CACs will be consistent with those commonly used in the US and the UK markets since the G10 report on CACs.
CACs will be introduced in a way which preserves a level playing field among euro area Member States.
This implies the use of
identical and standardized clauses
for all euro area Member States, harmonized in the terms and conditions of securities issued by the Members States.
Their basis will be
consistent with the CACs that are common in New York and English law
.
CACs will include an
aggregation clause
, enabling a super majority of bondholders across multiple bond issues subject to such a clause and subject to the law of a single jurisdiction to include a majority action clause where the needed majority of creditors for the restructuration would not be attained within a single bond issue.
Appropriate representation
will be put in place.
Most important issues – the reserve matters – (e.g. key payment terms, conversion or exchange of bonds) will be decided with a larger
majority
than non-reserve matters.
Appropriate
quorum
requirements will apply.
Changes agreed by the relevant majorities are binding on all bondholders.
An appropriate
disenfranchisement
clause will apply to ensure a proper voting process.
Appropriate clauses to prevent disruptive legal action will be considered.
CACs will be introduced in a standardized manner, which ensures that their legal impact is identical in all euro-area jurisdictions and so preserves a level playing field among euro-area Member States.
The euro area Member States will adopt the necessary measures to give effect to the CACs.
Euro area Member States will be allowed to continue to „tap“ outstanding debt without CACs under pre-determined conditions after June 2013 in order to preserve the necessary liquidity of old bonds and to give sufficient time to euro area Member States to create, in an orderly fashion, new bonds on all benchmark maturities.
The detailed legal arrangements for including CACs in euro-area government securities will be decided on the basis of work to be undertaken by the EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, following appropriate consultation with market participants and other stakeholders, and be finalised by the end of 2011.
3.
Preferred Creditor Status of the ESM
Like the IMF, the ESM will provide financial assistance to a Member State when its regular access to market financing is impaired.
Reflecting this, Heads of State or Government have stated that the ESM will enjoy preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to the IMF, while accepting preferred creditor status of IMF over ESM.
This shall be effective as of 1 July 2013 without prejudice to the terms and conditions of any other agreement provided under the EFSF and the Greek facility.
Transitional arrangements between EFSF and ESM
As originally foreseen, the EFSF will remain in place after June 2013 so as to administer the outstanding bonds.
It will remain operational until it has received full payment of the financing granted to the Member States and has repaid its liabilities under the financial instruments issued and any obligations to reimburse guarantors.
Undisbursed and unfunded portions of existing loan facilities should be transferred to the ESM (e.g. payment and financing of instalments that would become due only after the entry into force of ESM).
The consolidated EFSF and ESM lending shall not exceed € 500 bn.
To ensure a smooth transition from the EFSF to the ESM, the CEO of the EFSF will be tasked with the practical preparation of the establishment of the ESM.
He will regularly report on the progress made to the Eurogroup Working Group.
Participation of the non euro area Member States
Non euro area Member States can participate on an
ad hoc
basis alongside the ESM in financial assistance operations for euro area Member States.
If non-euro area Member States participate in such operations, they will be represented in the relevant meetings of the ESM boards that will decide on the granting and the monitoring of the assistance.
They will have access to all relevant information in a timely manner and be appropriately consulted.
The euro area Member States will support equivalent creditor status of the ESM and that of other Member States lending bilaterally alongside the ESM.
Dispute settlement
If a dispute arises between a euro area Member State and the ESM in connection with the interpretation and application of the treaty establishing the ESM, the Board of Governors will decide on this dispute.
If the Member State contests this decision, such dispute shall be submitted to the European Court of Justice in accordance with Art.
273 TFEU.
With regard to the relationship between the ESM and third parties, the applicable governing law and jurisdiction will be dealt with by the legal and contractual documentation which will then be put in place between the ESM and those third parties.
Annex
: ESM contribution key based on the ECB key
ESM contribution key
Country
ISO
ESM key
Austria
AT
2.783
Belgium
BE
3.477
Cyprus
CY
0.196
Estonia
EE
0.186
Finland
FI
1.797
France
FR
20.386
Germany
DE
27.146
Greece
EL
2.817
Ireland
IE
1.592
Italy
IT
17.914
Luxembourg
LU
0.250
Malta
MT
0.073
Netherlands
NL
5.717
Portugal
PT
2.509
Slovakia
SK
0.824
Slovenia
SI
0.428
Spain
ES
11.904
Total
EA17
100.0
Notes:
The ESM key is based on the ECB capital contribution key.
Member States with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the EU average will benefit from a temporary correction for a period of 12 years after their entry in the euro area.
This temporary correction will be three quarters of the difference between GNI and ECB capital shares (effectively comprising of 75% of GNI share and 25% of ECB capital share) as follows:
ESM share = ECB key share - 0,75*(ECB key share - GNI share)
The downwards compensation on those countries is redistributed among all the other countries according to their ECB key share.
GNI and GDP per capita in 2010.
Sources:
ECB, Ameco and DG ECFIN calculations.
