KONČNO
A6-0060/2005
21.3.2005
***I
POROČILO
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
(KOM(2004)0629 – C6‑0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))
Odbor za razvoj
Poročevalec(*):
David Martin , Odbor za mednarodno trgovino
(*) Okrepljeno sodelovanje med odbori - člen 47 Poslovnika
PE 353.674v02-00
Oznake postopkov
* Postopek posvetovanja
večina oddanih glasov
**I Postopek sodelovanja (prva obravnava)
večina oddanih glasov
**II Postopek sodelovanja (druga obravnava)
večina oddanih glasov za odobritev skupnega stališča
absolutna večina poslancev Parlamenta za zavrnitev ali spremembo skupnega stališča
*** Postopek privolitve
absolutna večina poslancev Parlamenta, razen v primerih, navedenih v členih 105, 107, 161 in 300 Pogodbe ES in členu 7 Pogodbe EU
***I Postopek soodločanja (prva obravnava)
večina oddanih glasov
***II Postopek soodločanja (druga obravnava)
večina oddanih glasov za odobritev skupnega stališča
absolutna večina poslancev Parlamenta za zavrnitev ali spremembo skupnega stališča
***III Postopek soodločanja (tretja obravnava)
večina oddanih glasov za odobritev skupnega besedila
(Vrsta postopka je odvisna od pravne podlage, ki jo predlaga Komisija.)
Spremembe zakonodajnega besedila
Pri spremembah, ki jih predlaga Parlament, je spremenjeno besedilo označeno s krepkim poševnim tiskom. Besedilo, zapisano v navadnem poševnem tisku, označuje tehničnim službam namenjeni del zakonodajnega besedila s predlaganimi popravki, ki se upoštevajo pri pripravi končnega besedila (na primer, očitne napake ali izpustitve v zadevni jezikovni različici). O teh popravkih odločajo pristojne tehnične službe.
VSEBINA
OSNUTEK ZAKONODAJNE RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA......................5
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT................................................................................................6
MNENJE ODBORA ZA ZUNANJE ZADEVE.........................................................................11
MNENJE ODBORA ZA MEDNARODNO TRGOVINO(*)....................................................14
MNENJE ODBORA ZA PRORAČUN.....................................................................................17
POSTOPEK..............................................................................................................................20
(*) Okrepljeno sodelovanje med odbori - člen 47 Poslovnika
OSNUTEK ZAKONODAJNE RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
( KOM(2004)0629 – C6‑0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD) )
(Postopek soodločanja: prva obravnava)
Evropski parlament ,
– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu ( KOM(2004)0629 )
Še neobjavljeno v UL. ,
– ob upoštevanju člena 251(2) in členov 179(1) in 181a(2) Pogodbe ES, na podlagi katerih je Komisija Parlamentu podala predlog ( C6‑0128/2004 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 51 svojega Poslovnika,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za razvoj in mnenj Odbora za zunanje zadeve, Odbora za mednarodno trgovino in Odbora za proračun( A6‑0060/2005 ),
1. zavrne predlog Komisije;
2. poziva Komisijo, naj umakne svoj predlog in sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za predložitev novega predloga, ki upošteva dvome Parlamenta;
3. naroči svojemu predsedniku, naj stališče Parlamenta posreduje Svetu in Komisiji.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
The Commission’s proposals for a series of regulations to rationalise the legislative instruments relating to external policy are broken down into geographical and thematic instruments, and additional elements.
The Committee on Development is particularly concerned at the Commission proposal to establish a single financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI). The DCECI would replace 16 existing regulations.
Parliament fully recognises the Commission's concerns regarding the need for an effective European development policy, and agrees that the present structure is in need of rationalisation, and that Parliament should play its part in bringing about all necessary reforms, including any new instruments that may be required. The Committee on Development is willing to work closely and constructively with the Commission and the Council to bring about a reformed structure.
However, if the draft regulation currently proposed were to be adopted, it would have far-reaching political and budgetary management consequences.
The proposed regulation poses two kinds of problems:
- Marginalisation of the role and the powers of Parliament (proposed procedures);
- Merging together in an unnatural alliance two policy domains (economic cooperation and development cooperation) with quite distinct finalities and work methods, to the detriment of development cooperation.
1) The Commission claims that the proposed instruments are policy-driven. This may be the case for other proposals, but it is difficult to discern any single policy, either development or economic, behind the DCECI proposal:
- The existing development policy, as defined in the Development Policy Statement of November 2000, is notably absent - indeed, the proposal runs counter to both the spirit and the letter of that Statement;
- As the November 2000 Statement is currently being revised, and the discussion has only just started, the new Statement can clearly not underpin this legislative proposal.
The Commission should define clearly the policy objectives that give rise to this instrument and engage in debate with Parliament on them.
2) The DCECI proposal covers a wide range of countries, both developing and industrialised, while the Constitution and the EC Treaty provide the basis for a separate development policy for developing countries. It should be of major concern to Parliament that the DCECI contains provisions that fail to distinguish between the two, and which run counter to the principles laid down in the EC Treaty and the Constitution.
The DCECI proposal gives the strong impression that it is intended to serve a "default" function, i.e. encompassing anything not covered by the other regulations, thereby enabling the Commission to carry out a wide variety of actions in all countries not covered under other geographical instruments.
As a result, the only geographical limitation on its scope is a negative list, indicating the countries to which it is not applicable (Member States, countries eligible for Community assistance under the Pre-accession or the Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments, and international measures in multilateral frameworks).
3) Commission sources claim that it is necessary to have an "economic and development instrument" to facilitate economic actions in developing countries. However, in 2001 they themselves proposed under the development legal base (Art. 179 TEC) a regulation for cooperation with Asia and Latin America which included provision for cooperation to "promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system and the implementation of WTO agreements". The Commission clearly considered then that the development legal base was appropriate for actions in the economic sphere in developing countries. However, even if the new Article 181A on economic cooperation is required for economic actions in developing countries, nothing would prevent the Commission from proposing separate instruments for developing and industrialised countries.
4) No general objective is given in the proposal. In its place is a non-exhaustive list giving, in very general terms, the sectors which may be supported. This is given as: " inter alia , development cooperation, economic, financial, scientific and technical cooperation and all other forms of cooperation with partner countries and regions, and international measures to promote the objectives of the EU's internal policies abroad". While the Commission, Parliament and the Council have repeatedly insisted that the Millennium Development Goals must be at the core of Community development policy, they are not mentioned as an objective (in fact, they are mentioned only once in the DCECI proposal, in a recital - which is not legally binding). Within the very broad definition of the objectives, decisions on sectors to be supported would be made without need to refer to Parliament. The current proposal therefore leaves open to question whether the Commission would use the very broad powers afforded to it under this text to address the basic objectives of development cooperation (i.e. poverty alleviation through the MDGs).
The proposal gives a detailed list of 31 sectors to which measures may relate, but the inclusion of " inter alia " in the introduction makes it non-exhaustive. Furthermore, the final sector, given as "any other area appropriate for achieving the objectives laid down in Articles 177 to 181A of the Treaty", also opens the door for actions in other sectors not included in the list.
As a result, the proposal contains, in terms of political coverage, a mixture of objectives and policies (including encouraging trade between the European Community and industrialised countries, managing asylum and migration flows, as well as counter-terrorism measures, mentioned several times in the Legislative Financial Statement and therefore presumably covered by " inter alia " in the legal text).
5) The financial envelope does not earmark funds for specific policy objectives, and the only specific envelope mentioned is that corresponding to the EDF, for ACP countries. Apart from this, the proposal allows for fungibility (interchangeability), so it is not possible to separate the financial allocation for development from that for other objectives, notably economic policy objectives. These allocations are to be determined by "programming documents" over which Parliament would have no say. Although separate budget lines could be introduced during the annual budget procedure, these may still be subject to transfers without parliamentary approval if they are within the same budget chapter. Parliament should be extremely concerned about the implications of such provisions.
6) Certain consequences of the proposed DCECI are especially serious and would not be acceptable to Parliament. The proposal gives very extensive powers of implementation to the Commission and Council, which also extend to policy formulation and management of resources. This is at the expense of the powers currently exercised by Parliament under the codecision procedure and also its powers under the annual budgetary procedure.
How far Parliament could continue to exercise its current influence under the annual budgetary procedure is open to question. The Commission has not yet released any indication of their likely proposals on the structure of the budget under the new Financial Perspectives. At present many budget lines relate directly to programmes that would be replaced and subsumed into the DCECI. While the Commission has indicated it will not seek to propose a single line to correspond to the DCECI regulation, it has for several years sought to simplify the current structure of the budget by reducing the number of development lines. It will therefore be necessary for Parliament to be very vigilant to forestall erosion of its powers.
At present, most development policy initiatives are based on separate codecided regulations that are usually in force for a limited period, after which time the policy is reviewed and a new regulation adopted. Thus Parliament has its say, on a regular basis, in determining the objectives, scope and methods to be employed for each policy sector. However, the current proposal would itself serve as the legal base for all future actions, whether under new initiatives or not, making new legislation unnecessary. Periodic legislation would give way to a comitology procedure, involving only the Commission and Council, which would adopt strategy and other programming documents. The effect would be that the legislative power of Parliament in this area would be abolished at a stroke. Furthermore, the proposed regulation would be in force for an indeterminate period, and contains a provision for review only at the initiative of the Commission. Parliament would therefore be unable to recover its lost powers.
7) The Commission may view the current revision of the Development Policy Statement as a means to add a development policy orientation to the all-encompassing administrative provisions of the DCECI proposal. However, this is a political statement that is not legally binding and, as mentioned previously, has not been respected at all in the current proposal. Such a Policy Statement would therefore be a poor recompense for relinquishing codecision powers.
8) Under the proposed regulation consultation with civil society on geographic and thematic programmes would only be envisaged by the Commission "when possible", calling into question the Commission's stated commitment to civil society participation in EC aid programming and undermining the basis for non-state actors’ participation under the Cotonou Agreement. This is not acceptable.
9) The Commission admits that the structure of the proposed instruments under Heading 4 (dealing with all external action of the EU) means that "a precise figure for ODA under Heading 4 of the new Financial Perspectives cannot be provided as it will depend on the future programming of funds under the different instruments"
Technical Fiche 37. . This is largely due to the DCECI's lack of financial visibility for development funding.
Conclusions
To quote UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, for selfless reasons and for reasons of healthy self interest the needs of the developing world must be at the top of the political agenda. Parliament would therefore welcome a more effective, more efficient, more generous and more targeted commitment on the part of the Union to the developing world. However, marrying economic cooperation with non-developing countries and development cooperation with the poorest countries does not take due account of the needs of the developing world and either selfless duty or "healthy self interest". To meet our objectives, whatever agreed reforms are necessary should be put in place, but reforms must be accompanied by accountability and transparency.
The proposed regulation fails to meet the considerations stated above, notably with regard to transparency, which is linked to democratic oversight. In addition, tying development cooperation to economic cooperation with industrialised countries is neither necessary nor desirable.
It is quite clear that many of the difficulties from a development perspective posed by this draft regulation are a direct consequence of the hybrid nature of the text. The attempted 'tour de force' of merging two different and distinct sets of objectives and tools into a single regulation has detrimental consequences for development cooperation. This is because most of the internationally accepted and adopted best practices in development cooperation have been abandoned in the proposal. This 'acquis' of 35 years of development cooperation has become part of the legal framework governing EU development policy, which is in line with what most donors do. It includes concentration, coherence, coordination, harmonisation, ownership by the beneficiaries and involvement of all stakeholders. The Commission seeks to move outside this framework and, in doing so, has greatly diluted the development focus of the Regulation.
There is a major imbalance between a desire on the part of the Commission for more flexibility at the level of micro-management (which is perfectly understandable) and the need for accountability and for an open and transparent democratic debate on the strategies and priorities of EU aid. Defending Parliament's democratic role and influence can and must be seen as a worthy objective in itself. It may also be necessary for achieving the modifications to the Commission package which Parliament deems necessary. Accountability to the elected representatives of EU citizens should not be abandoned for managerial and efficiency imperatives. A good balance between the two principles is feasible and must be struck.
The proposed regulation is so out of step with the development cooperation policies favoured by the European Parliament and is so inherently deleterious to Parliament’s powers as to be unamendable.
It is consequently proposed that the Commission withdraw this draft regulation and replace it with forward-thinking proposals that would correspond to current thinking on development while respecting the powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament. As a starting point Parliament must insist that the Commission take account of its concerns, as set out in this report, in the drafting of proposals to replace the current draft regulation.
15.3.2005
MNENJE ODBORA ZA ZUNANJE ZADEVE
za Odbor za razvoj
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o vzpostavitvi finančnega instrumenta za razvojno sodelovanje in gospodarsko sodelovanje
(KOM((2004)0629) – C6‑0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD) )
Pripravljavka mnenja:
Irena Belohorská
KRATKA OBRAZLOŽITEV
Po temeljiti obravnavi predloga Komisije za uredbo o vzpostavitvi finančnega instrumenta za razvojno sodelovanje in gospodarsko sodelovanje je pripravljavec osnutka prisiljen zaključiti, da je predlog v sedanji obliki nesprejemljiv. Številne ideje, ki jih vsebuje predlog Komisije, so precej zanimive in bi lahko, če bi bile primerno izvedene, dopustile novo dinamiko in zagotovile veliko bolj konkretne rezultate za politiko zunanjih ukrepov EU; kot takšne bodo deležne primerne razprave pozneje. Vendar zaradi znatne erozije pristojnosti Parlamenta kot posledice sprejetja navedenega predlaganega instrumenta poročevalec priporoča, da odbor glasuje proti predlogu, izrecno zaradi naslednjih razlogov:
Komisija predlaga „nov okvir za načrtovanje in pomoč pri izvedbi ... da bi bila zunanja pomoč Skupnosti bolj učinkovita“, in predstavlja več novih finančnih instrumentov, da bi to izvedla. Odboru predlagana nova uredba je „tretji splošni instrument, ki zagotavlja neposredno podporo zunanjim politikam Evropske unije.“ (Drugi pa so: instrument za predpristop, evropski sosedski in partnerski instrument, instrument stabilnosti). Vendar je jasno, da se morajo štiri nove uredbe o zunanjih finančnih instrumentih razumeti in obravnavati kot del paketa.
Odbor za zunanje zadeve priznava pomembnost predvidenega racionaliziranega/prečiščenega pristopa, da bo zunanja pomoč lahko bolj usklajena. Vendar tudi opozarja na dejstvo, da bi predlagani instrumenti spodkopali vlogo Parlamenta pri določanju politike. Rezultat bi bil, da Parlament ne bi mogel več opravljati svoje demokratične vloge v postopku določanja politike dodeljevanja denarne podpore posebnim programom.
Nujno je, da Evropski parlament lahko izvaja pristojnosti, ki so mu podeljene s pogodbami, in tako zagotavlja nove finančne instrumente z večjo legitimnostjo, demokratičnim nadzorom in preglednostjo.
Nadaljnja – in pomembna – zadeva je, da nove uredbe nimajo določene časovne razporeditve.
Člen 26 predlagane uredbe, ki se tukaj pregleduje (finančni instrument za razvojno sodelovanje in gospodarsko sodelovanje) velja za možnost pregleda, toda opozoriti je treba, da je to zgolj možnost („Komisija do 31. decembra 2011 predloži Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu vsak predlog v zvezi s prihodnostjo te uredbe in vsako spremembo, ki bi lahko bila potrebna“). Potrebna je jasna specifikacija določenega obdobja uporabe uredbe, da bo Parlament lahko, ko poteče, polno sodeloval pri pregledu instrumentov.
Ker je jasno, da zgoraj omenjeni elementi še zdaleč niso zadovoljivi, Odbor za zunanje zadeve predlaga, da se odobri položaj glavnega odbora, Odbora za razvoj, in priporoča, da Parlament zavrne predlog Komisije. Hkrati poziva Komisijo, da nemudoma ponovno pregleda celoten „paket“ in povsem upošteva zadržke Parlamenta.
Zakonodajni predlog
Odbor za zunanje zadeve priporoča, da se predlog Komisije zavrne.
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Predlog Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
Referenčni dokumenti
KOM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD)
Pristojni odbor
DEVE
Odbori, zaprošeni za mnenje
Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
AFET
26.1.2005
Okrepljeno sodelovanje
ne
Pripravljavec(ka) mnenja Datum imenovanja
Irena Belohorská 30.11.2004
Obravnava v odboru
15.3.2005
Datum sprejetja sprememb
15.3.2005
Izid končnega glasovanja
za:
proti:
vzdržani:
38
0
0
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Vittorio Emanuele Agnoletto, Monika Beňová, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Paul Marie Couteaux, Simon Coveney, Ryszard Czarnecki, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Maciej Marian Giertych, Ana Maria Gomes, Jelko Kacin, Bogdan Klich, Joost Lagendijk, Cecilia Malmström, Willy Meyer Pleite, Francisco José Millán Mon, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Tobias Pflüger, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Ursula Stenzel, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Jan Marinus Wiersma, Josef Zieleniec
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Irena Belohorská, Marielle De Sarnez, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Tunne Kelam, Doris Pack, Athanasios Pafilis, Józef Pinior, Aloyzas Sakalas, Inger Segelström
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju v skladu s členom 178(2)
14.3.2005
MNENJE ODBORA ZA MEDNARODNO TRGOVINO
za Odbor za razvoj
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
(KOM((2004)0629) – C6‑0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD) )
Pripravljavec mnenja(*):
David Martin
(*) Okrepljeno sodelovanje med odbori - člen 47 Poslovnika
KRATKA OBRAZLOŽITEV
Po natančni preučitvi Predloga Komisije o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje, mora pripravljavec mnenja zaradi občutne oslabitve pristojnosti Parlamenta, do katere bi prišlo s sprejetjem predlaganega instrumenta, zaključiti, da je predlog v obstoječi obliki nesprejemljiv.
Čeprav je splošni cilj poenostavitve in racionalizacije zakonodajnih instrumentov, ki se nanašajo na zunanjo politiko, dobrodošel, pripravljavec mnenja meni, da novi predlog Komisije resno posega v pristojnosti, ki jih v skladu s Pogodbami Parlament trenutno izvaja v okviru postopka soodločanja in letnih proračunskih postopkov.
Štirje novi predlogi za instrumente zunanjega financiranja, ki v skladu z razlago Komisije predstavljajo paket, občutno omejujejo vlogo Parlamenta.
Instrumenti v obstoječi obliki Parlamentu onemogočajo izvajanje svoje demokratične vloge v postopku oblikovanja politike dodeljevanja sredstev konkretnim programom.
Poleg tega so v primerjavi z nekdanjo in sedanjo prakso nove uredbe odprtega tipa in bi Parlamentu onemogočile sodelovanje v prihodnjih ocenah instrumentov. Parlament bi moral ohraniti možnost polnega rednega sodoločanja ciljev, obsega in metod, ki bodo uporabljene v različnih instrumentih. Zato je potrebno točno opredeliti obdobje izvajanja.
Na kratko, da bi poskrbeli za večjo učinkovitost zunanje pomoči Skupnosti, mora Evropski parlament obvezno ohraniti pooblastila, ki so mu bila dodeljena s Pogodbami, s čimer bi novim instrumentom zagotovil legitimnost, demokratični nadzor in preglednost.
Na podlagi teh razlogov Odbor za mednarodno trgovino predlaga zavrnitev predloga Komisije.
Odbor za mednarodno trgovino poziva Komisijo, naj skupaj s Parlamentom takoj stori vse potrebno za posredovanje novega paketa finančnih instrumentov, v katerem bodo pomisleki Parlamenta upoštevani.
ZAKONODAJNI PREDLOG
Odbor za mednarodno trgovino priporoča zavrnitev predloga Komisije.
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Predlog Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
Referenčni dokumenti
( KOM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD) )
Pristojni odbor
DEVE
Odbori, zaprošeni za mnenje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
INTA 26.1.2005
Okrepljeno sodelovanje
da
Poročevalec(-ka) Datum imenovanja
David Martin 16.11.2004
Obravnava v odboru
22.2.2005
14.3.2005
Datum sprejetja
14.3.2005
Izid končnega glasovanja
za:
proti:
vzdržani:
16
0
0
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Daniel Caspary, Françoise Castex, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Sajjad Karim, Caroline Lucas, Erika Mann, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Peter Šťastný, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke in Zbigniew Zaleski
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis in Pierre Jonckheer
Namestniki (člen 178(2)), navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
16.3.2005
MNENJE ODBORA ZA PRORAČUN
za Odbor za razvoj
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
(KOM((2004)0629) – C6‑0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD) )
Pripravljavec mnenja:
Reimer Böge
KRATKA OBRAZLOŽITEV
1. The draftsman notes that the proposed Regulation is a piece of "enabling" legislation (concentrating very much on procedure and only referring to other documents where policy is actually formulated). The Parliament would seem to have little influence of the real policy formulation. The scope of the Regulation is large encompassing 16 current ones and ranging from poverty alleviation in Africa to trade promotion with industrialised countries.
2. From a point of view of parliamentary oversight, clear objectives and transparency the draftsman finds this doubtful although it will be for the lead committees to evaluate. The draftsman notes, however, that the proposal has been met with very grave concerns by the committees responsible in the external field.
3. The proposed Instrument would operate at four different levels:
· The Co-Decision Financial Framework proposed in Article 24 : EUR 44 229 million for 2007-2013 out of which EUR 23 572 for the ACP States (budgetization of the EDF). This framework would replace the budgetary envelopes of 16 current regulations (some co-decisions and some not).
· A "Strategic Level" at which geographical or thematic programmes will be drawn up (by the Commission in co-ordination with Member States) and under which Strategy Papers will be adopted.
· Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (normally 3 years) setting the medium-term planning and the priority areas selected. These will set out the indicative financial allocations, overall and per priority area.
· Annual Action Programmes based on the levels above. These will specify in more detail the objectives and lay down the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned.
4. Article 14 states that "Budget commitments shall be made on the basis of decisions taken by the Commissi o n in accordance with Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 11(2) ". This means in accordance with Strategy Papers (art. 7.1), multi-annual indicative programme s (art.8.1) and other support measures (art. 11.2). The Parliament has no say in establishing these.
5. The draftsman has noticed great concern among committees as to the influence the Parliament would have. At the same time, questions have surfaced as to whether the budgetary powers of Parliament could/should offset this perceived lack of influence over policy. The draftsman is not ready to proceed along those lines, as there are limits to what could reasonably be expected through the annual budget. For example, even if the Parliament where to adopt budget appropriations for a particular priority, there could be real problems of implementation if the Commission considered that it was not in line with the letter and objectives of the legal text. This creates some serious problems of interpretation because, as mentioned before, the regulation itself is only of a framework nature and does not really contain the policy.
6. The draftsman must conclude that it would be dangerous to simply hope to use the budgetary powers of Parliament as a "saviour" if there is a serious problem with the legal text as it is proposed.
7. Therefore, the lack of involvement of the Parliament in policy choices would lead the draftsman to support the lead committee's draft report recommending the rejection of the draft regulation, and asking the Commission to bring forward new proposals.
8. Lastly, it should be recalled that the draft Constitution will confer new powers upon the European Parliament during the period covered by the next financial framework ; therefore is determined to reject any legal commitment which would undermine the Parliament’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives in future .
ZAKONODAJNI PREDLOG
Odbor za proračun predlaga zavrnitev predloga Komisije.
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Predlog Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
Referenčni dokumenti
KOM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 - 2004/0220(COD)
Pristojni odbor
DEVE
Odbor zaprošen za mnenje
Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
BUDG
26.1.2005
Okrepljeno sodelovanje
ne
Pripravljavec osnutka Datum imenovanja
Reimer Böge 31.1.2005
Obravnava v odboru
15.3.2005
Datum sprejetja sprememb
15.3.2005
Izid končnega glasovanja
za: 14
proti: -
vzdržani: -
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Reimer Böge, Den Dover, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Markus Ferber, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Dariusz Maciej Grabowski, Catherine Guy-Quint, Anne Elisabet Jensen, Janusz Lewandowski, Jan Mulder, László Surján, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski, Ralf Walter
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Jacek Emil Saryusz-Wolski
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju v skladu s členom 178(2)
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Predlog Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o oblikovanju finančnega instrumenta za razvojno in gospodarsko sodelovanje
Referenčni dokumenti
KOM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD)
Pravna podlaga
Člen 251(2), 179(1) in 181A(2) ES
Podlaga v Poslovniku
Člen 51
datum predložen Parlamentu
1.10.2004
Pristojni odbor Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
DEVE 26.1.2005
Odbori, zaprošeni za mnenje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
INTA 26.1.2005
FEMM 26.1.2005
LIBE 26.1.2005
BUDG 26.1.2005
AFET 26.1.2005
Odbori, ki niso dali mnenja datum sklepa
FEMM 16.3.2005
LIBE 21.2.2005
Okrepljeno sodelovanje
INTA 24.2.2005
Poročevalec(-ka) Datum imenovanja
Gay Mitchell6.10.2004
Prejšnji poročevalec
Poenostavljeni postopek datum sklepa
člen 43(1) / člen 43(2) 0.0.0000
Oporekanje pravni podlagi datum mnenja JURI
/
Popravek finančne ocene sredstev datum mnenja BUGD
/
Posvetovanje z Evropskim ekonomsko-socialnim odbor Datum sklepa na zasedanju
Posvetovanje z Odborom regij Datum sklepa na zasedanju
Obravnava v odboru
18.1.2005
21.2.2005
Datum sprejetja
16.3.2005
Izid končnega glasovanja
za:
proti:
vzdržani:
33
0
0
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Alessandro Battilocchio, Margrietus van den Berg, Danutė Budreikaitė, Nirj Deva, Fernando Fernández Martín, Michael Gahler, Hélène Goudin, Jana Hybášková, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Glenys Kinnock, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Gay Mitchell, Luisa Morgantini, Józef Pinior, José Ribeiro e Castro, Toomas Savi, Pierre Schapira, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, María Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco, Anna Záborská and Jan Zahradil.
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Marie-Hélène Aubert, Ana Maria Gomes, Fiona Hall, Manolis Mavrommatis, Miloslav Ransdorf, Anne Van Lancker, Gabriele Zimmer
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju v skladu s členom 178(2)
Javier Moreno Sánchez
Datum predložitve – A6
21.3.2005
A6-0060/2005
Pripombe
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