KONČNO
A6-0197/2005
23.6.2005
POROČILO
o izvajanju informacijske in komunikacijske strategije v zvezi z evrom ter ekonomsko in monetarno unijo
(2005/2078(INI))
Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve
Poročevalec:
Jules Maaten
PE 357.610v02-00
VSEBINA
PREDLOG RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA.....................................................3
OBRAZLOŽITEV.......................................................................................................................9
POSTOPEK..............................................................................................................................14
PREDLOG RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA
o izvajanju informacijske in komunikacijske strategije v zvezi z evrom ter ekonomsko in monetarno unijo
( 2005/2078(INI) )
Evropski parlament ,
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije Svetu, Evropskemu parlamentu, Ekonomsko-socialnemu odboru in Odboru regij o izvajanju informacijske in komunikacijske strategije v zvezi z evrom ter Ekonomsko in monetarno unijo ( KOM(2004)0552 ),
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije Svetu, Evropskemu parlamentu, Evropskemu ekonomsko-socialnemu odboru, Odboru regij in Evropski centralni banki – prvo poročilo o praktičnih pripravah za prihodnjo razširitev evro-območja ( KOM(2004)0748 ),
– ob upoštevanju svojih stališč z dne 16. junija 2000
UL C 67, 1.3.2001, str. 324. o določbah, povezanih z uvedbo evra,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 6. julija 2000
UL C 121, 24.4.2001, str. 459. o informacijski in komunikacijski strategiji, Ekonomski in monetarni uniji (EMU) in evru do leta 2002,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 4. julija 2001 o sredstvih za pomoč gospodarskim subjektom pri prevzemanju evra
UL C 65 E, 14.3.2002, str. 162. ,
– ob upoštevanju člena 45 svojega Poslovnika,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A6–0197/2005 ),
A. ker se po šestih letih obstoja projekt vzpostavitve EMU in uvedba evra na splošno štejeta kot zelo uspešna,
B. ker je to podprto z velikim ugledom evra na mednarodnih finančnih trgih, vse pogostejšim izdajanjem računov v evrih in naraščajočo menjavo rezerv centralnih bank po svetu iz dolarjev v evre,
C. ker se na tej stopnji ne sme resno dvomiti v koristi enotne valute in njenih spremljajočih instrumentov – enotno monetarno politiko in boljšo uskladitev gospodarskih politik: cenejše financiranje, ki je na voljo zaradi preteklih nizkih ravni obrestnih mer, preglednost zvišanih cen, ki srednjeročno vodi k nižjim cenam, odprava tveganja, povezanega z menjalnim tečajem v evro-območju, olajševanje trgovanja in potovanja znotraj EU, pobuda državam članicam, da izvajajo fiskalno politiko, ki je usmerjena k stabilnosti,
D. ker ima določen del evropske javnosti do evra kljub temu negativen odnos, še zlasti v državah članicah, v katerih je nacionalna valuta vključena v visok menjalni tečaj v primerjavi z evrom; ker javnomnenjske raziskave Eurobarometra kažejo, da ta težnja narašča, glede na to, da je bila podpora valuti v evro-območju malo pred prehodom na evro 68-odstotna, takoj po prehodu 75-odstotna in v prvi polovici leta 2004 66-odstotna; ker so negativni izidi referendumov na Švedskem in Danskem tudi dokaz nasprotovanja javnosti enotni valuti v Evropi; ker javnomnenjske raziskave v novih državah članicah kažejo nekaj nasprotovanj sprejetju evra, ki jih povzroča predvsem pomanjkanje pomembnih informacij ;
E. ker je pomembno imeti razen kvantitativnih raziskav Eurobarometra tudi kvalitativne raziskave o globljih razlogih za odnos državljanov do evra; ker se samo s poglobljenimi intervjuji lahko ugotovijo dejanski razlogi, zakaj določene skupine ljudi zavračajo evro in zakaj so skeptične glede ekonomske in monetarne unije, in se uporabijo kot osnova za usmerjanje informacijske strategije, izbiro (evro-skeptičnih) socialnih skupin morajo določiti država članica in strokovni sodelavci za obveščanje,
F. ker se izkušnje v industriji in ugotovitve študij medijev o „poprodajnem trženju“ lahko uporabijo, da se potrdi pomembnost sporočila tudi po uvedbi evra. ker je prav tako pomembno pridobiti si ne samo zaupanje ljudi pred sprejetjem evra in vse do sprejetja, ampak tudi potrditi zaupanje pri tistih, ki so bili prepričani o pravilnosti svojih odločitev, in s komunikacijskimi sporočili in dogodki celo po uvedbi evra vplivati na njihova mnenja,
G. ker je potrebna usklajena, ambiciozna in trajna komunikacijska strategija o evru in EMU zaradi podpore enotne valute, izognitve preteklim napakam in priprave novih udeleženk na gladek prehod; ker sta Komisija in Evropska centralna banka (ECB), pod demokratičnim nadzorom Evropskega parlamenta in skupaj s finančnimi organi držav članic, glavna organa, odgovorna za uspešnost te strategije,
H. ker je nekoliko višja inflacija v novih državah članicah kot na evro-območju v srednjeročnem in dolgoročnem obdobju ne glede na uvedbo evra neizbežna zaradi bistvenih in stalnih razlik na ravni cen in zapletenega pojava dohajanja,
I. ker mora v smislu evropskega procesa demokratizacije vsaka informacijska in komunikacijska politika o evropski zadevi zaradi učinkovitosti postati del splošne informacijske in komunikacijske strategije Evropske unije, ki bo državljanom skladno dokazovala, da Unija prinaša koristi v njihovem vsakdanjem življenju,
1. pozdravlja prednosti EMU, kot so stabilnost cen, zmanjšanje stroškov transakcij, večja preglednost cen znotraj evro-območja, zmanjšana spremenljivost cen na mednarodnih tečajih valute in varovanje pred zunanjimi šoki, pretekle nizke obrestne mere, nizke hipotekarne stopnje, lažje potovanje; podpira evro kot močan simbol evropskega povezovanja in sredstva za približevanje evropskih državljanov, ki podpirajo Unijo;
2. ugotavlja očitno nepriljubljenost evra pri nekaterih državljanih; meni, da je to v nasprotju z dejstvom, da je evro verjetno najbolj uspešen projekt doslej; meni, da enotna valuta ostaja komunikacijska prednostna naloga EU; je prepričan, da je treba koristi evra in EMU – stabilnost cen, nizke hipotekarne stopnje, lažje potovanje, zaščito pred nihanji menjalnih tečajev in zunanjimi pretresi – še naprej oglaševati in podrobno razlagati javnosti; je prepričan, da mora biti poudarek namenjen zlasti obveščanju o novostih evropskih državljanov, potrošnikov in malih ter srednje velikih podjetij (MSP), ki nimajo ustreznih zmogljivosti, da se takoj prilagodijo transakcijam v evrih;
3. je prepričan, da se mora kampanja za evro in EMU osredotočiti na majhna mesta in oddaljene regije, kjer so možnosti za obveščanje javnosti, celo v današnjem času, še vedno omejene; meni, da je dvojno označevanje cen (v nacionalni valuti in v evru) potrebno, vse dokler se državljani zlasti v takih regijah v celoti ne seznanijo s tem sistemom, če si država članica tako želi;
4. meni, da je za ključne oblikovalce politike bistveno, da projekta evra ne jemljejo za dokončanega, ker bo njegovo dolgoročno stanje prispevalo k splošnemu napredku Unije in ker je priljubljenost evra prav tako pomembna v zvezi s prihodnjo ratifikacijo Pogodbe o Ustavi za Evropo;
5. podpira boljšo usklajenost gospodarske politike med državami članicami in previdno finančno poslovodenje znotraj meja reformiranega, vendar učinkovitega pakta stabilnosti in rasti; je prepričan, da spremenjeni pakt stabilnosti in rasti, kot ga je sprejel Evropski svet marca 2005, in pomembne uredbe Skupnosti v zvezi z določenimi temami s skladnim izvajanjem v državah članicah prispevajo k dolgoročni gospodarski stabilnosti držav članic in njihovi prilagodljivosti ciljem lizbonske strategije;
6. pozdravlja zadnje poročilo Komisije o njeni komunikacijski strategiji v zvezi z evrom, vendar ugotavlja, da je njen ton mogoče malo preveč optimističen glede na prevladujočo nepriljubljenost; poziva Komisijo, da sledi svojim glavnim komunikacijskim ciljem in obrazloži ukrepe, potrebne za to, da se dosežejo; poudarja pomembnost bolj intenzivne uporabe sodobnih tehnik trženja pri predstavljanju EMU javnosti, uveljavljanja EMU, evra in njegovih prednosti kot privlačnega „paketa“,
7. se strinja s Komisijo, da mora biti obveščevalna kampanja prilagojena kulturi, jeziku, mnenju širše javnosti in težavam državljanov različnih držav ter vprašanju, ali je država že znotraj evro-območja, ali bo vanj vstopila v kratkoročnem ali srednjeročnem obdobju, ali pa si želi ostati zunaj evro-območja;
8. še naprej podpira program PRINCE in zahteva povečanje sredstev, namenjenih za ta program; je prepričan, da je medinstitucionalni dialog o evru mogoče izboljšati prek medinstitucionalne skupine za informiranje; svari, da načelo sofinanciranja, ki je osnova programa PRINCE, lahko vodi do znatnih težav in zamud pri uvajanju evra v novih državah članicah, ki jim primanjkuje potrebnih proračunskih sredstev;
9. je prepričan, da je pomembno upoštevati zadeve državljanov iz treh predrazširitvenih držav, ki niso v evro-območju – Združeno kraljestvo, Švedska in Danska – in poziva Komisijo (črtano), da pomaga vladam tistih držav članic, ki si prizadevajo pridobiti skeptično javnost, če si te vlade to želijo;
10. je prepričan, da bo nedavna širitev EU postavila EMU pred pomembne izzive in enotno valuto; meni, da se mora Komisija osredotočiti na svoja prizadevanja za pomoč novim državam članicam, da pripravi njihove državljane na sprejetje evra z zavzemanjem za intenzivne obveščevalne kampanje, da nadzira njihovo izvajanje in spodbuja redno poročanje o izvajanju nacionalnih akcijskih načrtov za sprejetje evra, če se je takšna kampanja že začela;
11. poudarja, da lahko zahteva po dvojnem označevanju cen vsaj tri mesece pred uvedbo evra in največ 12 mesecev po tem, prvič, zmanjša strah ljudi pred porastom cen zaradi evra in, drugič, prepreči podjetjem in ponudnikom storitev, da bi preračunavanje v evre uporabljali kot izgovor za porast cen; meni, da je dvojno označevanje cen kot nacionalna pravna zahteva ali prek prostovoljnega kodeksa ravnanja trgovinske zbornice ali sporazuma med gospodarskimi in socialnimi partnerji pokazalo svojo vrednost ob uvedbi evra v mnogih državah prve dvanajsterice v evro-območju;
12. poziva Komisijo, da upošteva strah pred naraščanjem cen, ki ga izraža javnost novih držav članic; je prepričan, da se morajo izkušnje z nepravilnostmi in pretiranim zaokroževanjem v sedanjih članicah evro-območja upoštevati pri državah, ki bodo vstopile v evro-območje s preprečevanjem podobnih dogodkov; je prepričan, da je treba razliko med letno inflacijo in porastom cen, ki ga povzroči uvedba evra, razložiti vsem državljanom držav članic;
13. ugotavlja, da je v novih državah članicah v primerjavi s starimi državami članicami več finančnih transakcij v obliki gotovine kot v obliki elektronskih plačilnih sredstev; poziva Komisijo, države članice in nacionalne centralne banke, da to upoštevajo pri pripravi prehoda v novih državah članicah; spodbuja jih, da ta prehod izkoristijo za povečanje števila elektronskih plačil in plačil s karticami; je prepričan, da je krajše obdobje uporabe obeh valut najboljša možnost za uspešen prehod v novih državah članicah;
14. verjame, da sta najboljša praksa in znanje, pridobljena pri prejšnjih prehodih, uporabna za prehod v novih državah članicah in prihodnjih širitvah ter pripravah novih držav prosilk;
15. poziva Komisijo, da skupaj s socialnimi partnerji posveti večjo pozornost posvetovalnim postopkom, da bodo upoštevali potrebe javnosti in predvsem posameznih socialnih in gospodarskih organizacij;
16. zahteva dodatna finančna sredstva za vzpostavitev nacionalnih forumov za evro v vsaki državi članici pod odgovornostjo finančnega ministra in v tesnem sodelovanju z nacionalnimi centralnimi bankami, ssaj je ta sistem v preteklosti že dokazal svojo uporabnost; meni, da mora EU privzeti model „povezovanja“ na ravni finančnega ministrstva v centralnih bankah, pri čemer lahko stare države članice pripomorejo k širjenju najboljših praks in prenosu strokovnega znanja;
17. poziva Komisijo, da prepozna pomen dejavne vloge Evropskega parlamenta, državnih parlamentov ter regionalnih in lokalnih organov v smislu načrtovanja in izvajanja komunikacijske strategije o evru in EMU; je prepričan, da bodo dejavnosti teh institucij vzpostavile bolj demokratičen dialog o komunikacijski strategiji, ki bo boljše vključevala javna vprašanja;
18. poziva ECB, da v svoje letno poročilo ali posebno poročilo vključi kvantitativno analizo – o kateri naj razpravlja Evropski parlament – o koristih, ki jih je evro prinesel navadnim državljanom, s ponazorjenimi primeri, kako uporaba evra pozitivno vpliva na vsakdanje življenje ljudi;
19. prosi Komisijo, da izvede posebne raziskave mnenj v malih in srednje velikih podjetjih po vsej Evropi, zato da oceni raven sprejemanja valute v tem sektorju; meni, da je treba v takšni vseevropski raziskavi MSP izkoristiti vsako priložnost in in zagotoviti, da MSP prispevajo k stroškom, ker se lahko ugotovitve takšne raziskave – v nekaterih primerih z dodatnimi „skupnimi“ vprašanji –, uporabijo v lastni politiki poslovanja; poudarja pomembnost vključevanja avtomatizacije v komunikacijsko strategijo in strategijo pretvorbe, ker imata pomembno vlogo pri sprejetju novih kovancev in bankovcev v vsakdanjem življenju državljanov;
20. poziva bančni sektor, da zagotovi bančne avtomate, ki bodo omogočili strankam več manjših poimenovalnih kategorij – ker večina gotovinskih plačil v povprečju ne presega 15 do 20 evrov -, da se zmanjšajo količine gotovine, ki jo imajo trgovci v svojih blagajnah, hkrati pa tudi tveganje kraje; poleg tega ugotavlja, da to zmanjšuje tveganje za potrošnike, da bi prejemali ponarejen denar;
21. prosi Komisijo, da objavi analizo, o kateri bo razpravljal Evropski parlament, v zvezi s presežkom bankovcev za 500 evrov, ki so v obtoku in katerih izdaja se je v letu 2005 podvojila na 190 milijonov bankovcev zaradi povečanega povpraševanja gospodarskih subjektov z evro-območja; razume prednosti bankovca za 500 evrov kot sredstva za hranjenje premoženja, vendar svari pred možnimi tveganji, povezanimi z bankovcem tako visoke vrednosti v smislu pranja denarja in kaznivih dejanj;
22. opozarja na dvig elektronskega poslovanja pri transakcijah in zato dvomi v pomen ohranitve bankovcev za 500 EUR, ki je bil prvotno utemeljen s potrebo po upoštevanju navad potrošnikov v nekaterih državah članicah;
23. zahteva, da ECB objavi prošnje različnih centralnih bank za razdelitev bankovcev za 500 EUR;
24. obžaluje še vedno visoke stroške čezmejnih nakazil prebivalstva v evrih, čeprav je Uredba Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 2560/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. decembra 2001 o čezmejnih plačilih v evrih
UL L 344, 28.12.2001, str. 13. prinesla pomembna znižanja stroškov za čezmejna nakazila v evrih, in podpira vzpostavitev enotnega evropskega plačilnega območja; prosi Komisijo, da sestavi celovito zakonodajo na tem področju ter da izkoristi to priložnost za uskladitev elektronskih plačilnih sistemov v EU, da se zmanjšajo stroški, ki jih običajno nosijo potrošniki in MSP; poudarja, da učinkovitost sistema temelji na zaupanju potrošnikov, ki je odvisno od priznavanja njihovih pravic;
25. pozdravlja dejstvo, da je ECB zaposlena z drugo generacijo bankovcev; je prepričan, da je evro zaradi svojega obsega še posebej občutljiv za ponarejanje ter poziva ECB, da je zelo pozorna in upošteva dosedanje izkušnje pri oblikovanju nove generacije bankovcev; meni, da je nujno, da Europol in policijske enote držav članic obravnavajo to zadevo kot prednostno nalogo;
26. je prepričan, da je medinstitucionalni dialog o evru mogoče izboljšati prek medinstitucionalne skupine za informiranje; poziva Komisijo, da še naprej pošilja četrtletna pisna poročila Evropskemu parlamentu o programu PRINCE;
27. potrjuje svojo odločnost, izraženo v resoluciji o izvajanju informacijske in komunikacijske strategije Evropske unije z dne 12. maj 2005, da poglobi medinstitucionalno sodelovanje pri tej zadevi s pripravo velike letne razprave na podlagi poročila Komisije in ob sodelovanju odborov s celotno ali delno odgovornostjo za posamezne zadeve ter Sveta;
28. naroča svojemu predsedniku, da pošlje to resolucijo Svetu in Komisiji.
OBRAZLOŽITEV
I. Introduction
The publication in 2004 by the European Commission of its “Communication on the implementation of an information and communication strategy on the evro and Economic and Monetary Union”, has prompted the European Parliament to inaugurate a wide-ranging debate with all concerned stakeholders on an issue of vital importance for the European project: how to adequately inform European citizens and businesses of the benefits of our single currency, the evro, and its accompanying macroeconomic framework or EMU (Economic and Monetary Union).
The European Parliament has been closely involved in every stage of EMU, from the decision to launch the currency taken in Maastricht in 1992, leading to the 1st of January 1999 when the exchange rates of the participating Member States were irrevocably fixed against the evro and the European Central Bank was created, and finally to the subsequent physical changeover in 2002.
Now, nearly 7 years after the evro’s launch, and in light of the European Commission’s communication, your rapportevr believes that it is high time to evaluate EMU’s successes and failures, to propose solutions and to point the way forward.
II. The evro’s successes
EMU and the evro are the most successful pan-European projects ever. In historical terms it is difficult to find similar instances of building a single currency area in such a limited period of time. This report wishes to reiterate Parliament's wholehearted support for the evro as a powerful driver of European integration as well as a means of reaching the goals of our Union. Not only is the evro a symbol of a common identity and shared values, but it can act as a stimulus to further cohesion by proving that if Member States act together in a decisive manner, citizens can expect to reap widespread and long-lasting benefits.
The evro's success can be measured in many ways:
1. First and foremost, the single monetary policy and the enhanced co-ordination of economic policies that underpin the evro have brought about cheaper finance for all: interest rates are at historically low levels, fostering investment and consumption and resulting in real benefits for consumers, for example through low mortgage rates and cheap loans.
2. Secondly, increased price transparency within the evro area, together with the ECB's firm management of monetary policy, have lead to a stable environment including low inflation (only 2,3% in 2001 and 2002 subsequently), supporting private consumption.
3. In the third place, the evro has brought about improved resilience of the evro-area economies against financial crises. Without the single currency, recent events such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and 11 March 2004 in Madrid or the financial accounting scandals of 2002 would have triggered major turbulences in Europe as a whole and in many evro area economies in particular and would have made national currencies collapse.
4. Fourthly, the elimination of the exchange rate risk within the evro zone has made travel easier within the evro area without the hassle and cost of changing currencies. Travelling outside the evro area is also easier since the evro has become a widely accepted international currency.
5. In the fifth place, raw materials and oil being offered on the world market in US dollars, European consumers benefit from the relatively strong evro compared to the dollar. The positive exchange rate brings about relatively low fuel prices and lower foodstuff prices for the European consumers.
6. Another positive effect of the evro is that it has brought about an increase in trade within the EU. Several studies prove that EMU has had a positive impact on intra-evro area trade, by roughly 10 % on average for all the countries in the evrozone, and up to around 17 % in some countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium and Austria, since the evro came into being. In addition, the single currency has also contributed to increased trade with the outside world. Since 1999, international trade invoicing in evros has increased considerably.
7. In addition, the evro has gained a high standing in international financial markets, and is taking on an important role as an international reserve currency (from 13,5% of world reserves in 1999 to 19,7% in 2003). Thus, the evro is becoming a preferred vehicle for international investment and borrowing (international securities in evros now rival those in US dollars). In addition, this should strengthen Europe’s role in international fora and organisations.
8. Currency integration is also stimulating capital markets' integration inside the EU, triggering structural change in the banking and financial spheres. Cross-border business has increased and consolidation is on the rise. Ultimately more choice and lower prices should trickle down to the average financial services consumer.
9. Last but not least, EMU has created a welcome pressure on Member States to implement stability-oriented fiscal policies. The theory says that the existence of a currency union implies co-ordinated or harmonised fiscal policies, to reduce the risk of ‘free-riding’ by some Member States to a minimum. Back in 1999, the necessary disciplinary strait-jacket policy-makers came up with was the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. Despite the criticisms that can be levelled at it, it is clear that the Pact still proves its usefulness by improving fiscal discipline. Your rapportevr believes that the revision of the Pact recently agreed by the European Council can only be considered as an improvement if all Member States without exception adhere fully to the new agreement. If the new agreements are disrespected again the credibility of the evro as well as its public image will be permanently damaged.
All these benefits are the result of a very successful introduction strategy from a technical point of view, both in 1999 when the old currencies were converted to the evro, as in 2002 during the physical changeover. The logistical feat of simultaneously introducing banknotes and coins in 12 countries cannot be underestimated. Despite glitches here and there, the operation was successful, so much so that little thought is given to the implications behind it. Apart from the European Central Bank, the European Commission and Member State governments, stakeholders like SME’s consumer organisations, trade unions, employers' organisations etc have contributed to this success. The European Parliament played a pivotal role in providing strong backing to the Commission's efforts, by approving a significant budget for the campaign, and also by being a critical partner in the debate with the Commission and the ECB. More than €200 million of European Commission funds were allocated from 1996 to mid-2002, mainly from the PRINCE programme budget lines. Member States spent much more than this, and the ECB spent €80 million.
III. The evro’s problems
Having stated all of this, your rapportevr believes nevertheless that there is room for improvement as far as the communication strategy of the evro is concerned. After a significantly long period of 7 years of evro and EMU it is time take some distance and analyse our currency framework with objectiveness. This is all the more necessary because the Euro project is by no means over: in fact, promoting the virtues of the evro is an ongoing and everyday exercise; maintaining and improving the credibility and stability of the evro area is a never-ending task that needs constant care and attention. The possible future enlargement of the evro area to new countries merits an in-depth reflection on the way that policy makers should take to avoid the mistakes of the past and on how they can improve previous communication campaigns.
Indeed, it is dispiriting to notice that despite the objective benefits of the evro as described above, and despite the generally smooth changeover that occurred, a certain section of the European public continues to claim to have a negative perception of the evro. And it seems this tendency is on the rise. Baffling as this may be, policy makers, and notably the Commission and Member States' Finance ministries, need to take stock of these perceptions and undertake steps to correct them. Recent Eurobarometer polls show that support for the currency in the evro zone was 68% just before the changeover, 75% just after, and 66% in the first half of 2004.
These polls are reinforced by recent ones conducted in the new Member States, which also reflect an increasing hostility towards the adoption of the evro: only 44% of the population in the new Member States believe that the introduction of the evro will have positive consequences for their country, and 47% is unhappy about the evro replacing their national currency. Needless to say, public opinion in the three pre-enlargement non-evro countries, the UK, Sweden and Denmark, continues to be broadly opposed to the currency union, a fact that was brutally exposed in the negative results of the referenda in Sweden and Denmark.
Amongst a variety of reasons that are not the subject of this report (evroscepticism, nationalism, attachment to national traditions and so forth), one of the main reasons that public perception has been so negative in those Member States that adopted the evro is the feeling that prices increased dramatically after the changeover. The overall effect of the introduction of the evro on inflation is now estimated to have only been 0.2% in 2002. But this very low increase hides a reality that was painfully obvious to the man on the street during 2002 and 2003. Being an average, the figure disguises the enormous prices hikes in everyday consumption items such as coffee, vegetables, bread, newspapers, a haircut, local taxes, including parking meters, and so on. Although inflation around January 2002 was partly caused by bad harvests and other economic factors, it is the contention of your rapportevr that these perceptions were to a large extent compounded by some errors made during the changeover. For example, not enough information was provided to the average consumer on the likely risk that prices of everyday items and services would soar. Citizens were thus taken by surprise. And these impressions linger on for a long period of time. SMEs were also inadequately informed and were insufficiently supplied with enough cash to cope with all the transactions that took place in the first few months. Agreements between central governments and organisations of SME's and, more scandalously, local government to avoid unscrupulous price increases appear not to have worked or only up to a point. Finally, it is now clear that it was a mistake to stop communication campaigns on the evro so early after its physical introduction. More time would have been needed to solidify the evro's image in the public's eye and to swiftly correct the wrong impressions caused by some price increases: albeit being of minor economic importance for the overall economy, they weighed heavily on the average consumers' budget. Therefore this rapportevr proposes the presentation by the ECB of a yearly quantitative analysis of the benefits the evro has brought about for ordinary citizens. This has the added advantage of forcing the EU policy makers to take into account not only macro-economic aspects of the development of the currency but also its effects for ordinary citizens.
Several other benefits of the evro, such as greater price transparency and its effects on competition, will only come if and when governments take the necessary measures in completing the internal market, hopefully in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy.
IV. Proposals for improvement
With this in mind, this report's aim is to try to suggest what is a possible way forward. It does not claim to set out a detailed spending programme on communication campaigns or other details but rather to present the European public with clear political messages and choices, thereby setting the ground for the Commission and the Member States to take up a vigorous defence of the currency.
The single currency remains and should indefinitely remain as a communication priority for the EU. The benefits of the evro and of EMU need to be sold and explained to the public continuously: policy-makers cannot let their guard down. If the evro project is taken for granted, any external shock or political crisis could trigger an attack on the currency union. The evro should not be the scapegoat for others' failures. This is particularly relevant in light of the different referenda currently being held in the EU to ratify the Constitutional Treaty.
Your rapportevr therefore welcomes the Commission's latest report on its communication strategy on the evro but believes that it is excessively optimistic in view of the problems mentioned above. The Commission needs to clarify its key communication targets and to detail the steps needed to achieve them. It should apply more modern 'marketing' techniques and try to sell the evro and its benefits as a global ‘package’. For this, it is necessary that the European Parliament continues its strong support of the PRINCE programme and authorises an increase in funds for it.
Special mention is made of the non-evro EU Member States. Specific action plans are needed to help the governments of those Member States to win over their sceptic public opinions. There is ample evidence and research that proves that if the citizens of these countries are properly presented with the objective facts, they will change their minds. However, there has not been enough political willingness from the political authorities, particularly in the UK, Sweden and Denmark, to really market the evro in a credible way. And the same is happening in the new Member States that joined the EU in 2004. Politically, the enlargement is of tremendous significance, though less so in pure macroeconomic terms. That, perhaps, may be the reason why the authorities of those Member States have yet to pay enough attention to a coherent evro communication strategy. None of the 10 new Member States is a member of the evrozone yet but they have no opting-out and will have to adopt the currency sooner or later. The level of awareness about the obligation for new Member States to adopt the evro is worryingly low, since 57 % of the population believes that their country has a choice about adopting the evro. All the more reason for the Commission to concentrate its efforts on helping these countries in their path towards evro adoption, and in particular in allaying the fears of price increases that a considerable part of the public opinion has in the new Member States. It is also important to note that in the new Member States more financial transactions take the form of cash rather than electronic means of payment. One option to help the changeovers is the setting up of National Forums for the evro, under the responsibility of the minister of Finance. Moreover, the report supports the ‘twinning’ model whereby each new Member State is sponsored by a ‘mentor’ from one of the evro zone countries. Finally, your rapportevr believes that a short period of dual circulation is the best option for a successful changeover in the new countries.
This report also calls for a series of specific actions to foster acceptance of the evro:
q Investigation into the malpractices and instances of excessive rounding-up that occurred during the 2002 changeover;
q Specific opinion polls with SMEs to assess their level of acceptance of the currency, to be undertaken by the Commission;
q More 20 evro notes to be dispensed by ATMs instead of 50 evro ones in order to reduce the cash amounts shopkeepers have in their tills and thus diminish the risk of robbery;
q A study by the Commission on the excess of 500 evro notes in circulation, which could trigger risks as far as money laundering and crime is concerned;
q Comprehensive legislation by the Commission to create a true Single European Payments Area in Europe in order to reduce the high cost of cross-border retail payments;
q Warning to the Europol and the Member States' police on the risks to counterfeiting of the new generation of banknotes.
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Izvajanje informacijske in komunikacijske strategije v zvezi z evrom ter Ekonomsko in monetarno unijo
Št. postopka
2005/2078(INI)
Podlaga v Poslovniku
člen 45
Pristojni odbor Datum razglasitve dovoljenja na zasedanju
ECON 9.06.2005
Odbori, zaprošeni za mnenje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
CULT 9.6.2005
Odbori, ki niso dali mnenja Datum sklepa
Okrepljeno sodelovanje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
Predlog(-i) resolucije, vključen(-i) v poročilo
Poročevalec(-ka) Datum imenovanja
Jules Maaten 21.9.2004
Nadomeščeni(-a) poročevalec(-ka)
Obravnava v odboru
14.3.2005
18.4.2005
23.5.2005
15.6.2005
Datum sprejetja
15.6.2005
Izid končnega glasovanja
za:
proti:
vzdržani:
35
2
0]
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Pervenche Berès, Sharon Margaret Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Paolo Cirino Pomicino, Jan Christian Ehler, Elisa Ferreira, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Gunnar Hökmark, Benoît Hamon, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Wolf Klinz, Guntars Krasts, Enrico Letta, Gay Mitchell, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, John Whittaker
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Mia De Vits, Satu Hassi, Ján Hudacký, Syed Saleh Kamall, Jules Maaten, Tobias Pflüger
Namestniki (člen 178(2)), navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Antonio Masip Hidalgo
Datum predložitve – A6
20.6.2005
A6-0197/2005
