KONČNO
A6-0065/2006
20.3.2006
POROČILO
o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurenčnosti 2004
(2005/0000(INI))
Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve
Poročevalec:
Alain Lipietz
PE 362.754v02-00
VSEBINA
PREDLOG RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA.....................................................3
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT................................................................................................7
POSTOPEK..............................................................................................................................11
PREDLOG RESOLUCIJE EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA
o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurenčnosti 2004
( 2005/2209(INI) )
Evropski parlament ,
- ob upoštevanju poročila Komisije o politiki konkurenčnosti 2004 ( SEC(2005)0805 ),
– ob upoštevanju sklepov predsedstev Evropskega sveta v Lizboni 23. in 24. marca 2000, Evropskega sveta v Göteborgu 15. in 16. junija 2001, Evropskega sveta v Laeknu 14. in 15. decembra 2001, Evropskega sveta v Barceloni 15. in 16. marca 2002 ter Evropskih svetov v Bruslju 20. in 21. marca 2003, 25. in 26. marca 2004 ter 22. in 23. marca 2005,
– ob upoštevanju poročila iz novembra 2004 z naslovom „Sprejeti izziv - lizbonska strategija za rast in zaposlovanje“ skupine na visoki ravni o lizbonski strategiji pod predsedstvom Wima Koka,
– ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta št. 1/2003 z dne 16. januarja o izvajanju pravil konkurence iz členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe
UL L 1, 4.1.2003, str. 1. in Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 733/2004 z dne 7. aprila 2004 glede vodenja postopkov Komisije iz členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES
UL L 123, 27.4.2004, str. 18. , ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij
UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1 . ,
– ob upoštevanju Uredbe Komisije št. 794/2004 z dne 21. aprila 2004 glede izvajanja Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 o podrobnih pravilih za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES
UL L 140, 30.4.2004, str. 1 . , Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 364/2004 z dne 25. februarja 2004 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 70/2001 glede širitve področja njene uporabe na pomoč raziskavam in razvoju
UL L 63, 28.2.2004, str. 22 . in Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 363/2004 z dne 25. februarja 2004, ki spreminja Uredbo (ES) št. 68/2001 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES pri pomoči za usposabljanje
UL L 63, 28.2.2004, str. 20 . ,
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije z naslovom „Smernice Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah“
UL C 244, 1.10.2004, str. 2 ,
– ob upoštevanju sodne prakse Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti glede storitev splošnega interesa in posebej sodbe Altmark
Zadeva C-280/00, Altmark Trans in Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark, ECR 2003, str. I-7747. ,
– ob upoštevanju člena 45 in člena 112(2) svojega Poslovnika,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A6‑0065/2006 ),
1. pozdravlja dejstvo, da se je od 1. maja 2004 politika konkurence Skupnosti razširila na deset novih držav članic, njihovi nacionalni organi pa so se pridružili Evropski mreži organov za varstvo konkurence (European Competition Network - ECN) z namenom, da bi jih vključili v Evropsko unijo;
2. še vedno zagovarja mnenje, da se bo zaradi dejavnejše in vedno pomembnejše vloge Evropskega parlamenta politika konkurence izvajala bolj transparentno in legitimno, in ponavlja prizadevanje Parlamenta glede dodeljevanja pristojnosti soodločanja;
3. podpira politiko konkurence, za katero si prizadeva EU na splošno, in ceni posodobitve, ki jih je na področju konkurence izpeljala Komisija ;
4. nujno poziva k hitremu dokončanju zaključnega dela posodobitve politike konkurenčnosti, to je v zvezi z uporabo člena 82 Pogodbe ES o prepovedi zlorabe prevladujočega položaja; poudarja, da je v zvezi s tem treba upoštevati dinamiko vedno bolj globaliziranih trgov;
5. izraža zadovoljstvo, ker sodbe Sodišča redkeje nasprotujejo sklepom Komisije, a obžaluje, da še vedno obstajajo velike razlike, kako si bo Komisija v praksi razlagala preskus iz sodbe Sodišča v primeru Altmark; poziva Komisijo, naj izda jasno in natančno razlago, ki bo pojasnila četrto merilo iz sodbe v primeru Altmark;
6. obžaluje, da poročilo o konkurenčnosti 2004 ne posveča posebnega poglavja razpravi o storitvah splošnega interesa, kot je to bilo od vključno poročila 2001 dalje, ter poziva Komisijo, da v bodočih poročilih ponovno uporabi ta pristop;
7. pozdravlja paket za posodobitev, ki ga je sprejela Komisija, novo shemo za splošne izjeme v sporazumih o prenosu tehnologije in napredek pri razlikovanju med dostopnimi in nedostopnimi dokumenti ter določanju standardov za ravnanje z zaupnimi informacijami v postopkih;
8. opozarja na dejstvo, da je v letu 2004 Komisija proučila nekatera zelo pomembna področja, na primer širokopasovne internetne storitve, „sledenje“ v mednarodnih klicih in telekomunikacije, in jo poziva, naj budno spremlja njihov razvoj, da bi tako spodbudila konkurenco na področjih, ki so izjemnega pomena za razvoj informacijske družbe;
9. poziva Komisijo, naj prouči in nadrobno razčleni probleme, povezane s kolektivnimi pogajanji v občutljivih gospodarskih sektorjih, na primer v kmetijstvu, zlasti glede odnosov med malimi in srednjimi pridelovalci ali njihovimi združenji na eni strani in velikimi družbami za predelovanje in trženje na drugi;
10. čestita Komisiji za njen odločen in profesionalen pristop k boju proti zlorabam prevladujočega položaja in pozdravlja posvetovanje Komisije o bolj učinkovitem izvajanju člena 82;
11. poziva Komisijo, naj sprejme ukrepe, da se med nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco v Evropski mreži organov za varstvo konkurence (ECN) kar se da izboljša izmenjava informacij in njihova kakovost, kar naj zagotovi enotno izvajanje evropske politike konkurence;
12. poziva Komisijo, naj si prizadeva za spodbujanje pravilnega izvajanja pravil o konkurenci v vseh državah članicah in naj pravočasno posreduje, če pravila o konkurenci niso zadovoljivo ali enakopravno uporabljana;
13. opozarja, da mora uspešna politika konkurence nenehno upoštevati interese potrošnikov in ne sme biti instrument, ki bi na trgu povzročal motnje;
14. spodbuja Komisijo, naj razjasni včasih nejasne odnose med nacionalnimi organi, pristojnimi za konkurenco, in njihovimi „nacionalnimi prvaki“, da bi odvrnila vse sume o povezanosti in da bi zaščitila interese potrošnikov, saj so na primer v začetku leta 2005 mediji razkrili skrite dogovore med tremi največjimi francoskimi operaterji mobilne telefonije; priznava, da ni preteklo dovolj časa, da bi lahko ocenili učinkovitost reform, ki izvajanje protimonopolne zakonodaje ES decentralizirajo na raven nacionalnih organov za konkurenco;
15. čestita Komisiji za njeno skrbno spremljanje primerov združitev in nakupov, ki bi lahko vodili v okrepitev prevladujočih položajev;
16. izraža zaskrbljenost, ker še vedno ni uspela liberalizacija trgov EU na področju plina in elektrike ter pozdravlja sektorsko preiskavo Komisije na področju delovanja notranjega trga s plinom in elektriko;
17. pozdravlja sektorske preiskave, ki jih je sprožila Komisija, v zvezi s sistemi bančnih plačil in poslovnimi zavarovanji, hkrati pa poziva, naj postopek preiskave poteka tako, da zagotovi dovolj časa za pripravo popolnih in temeljitih odgovorov Komisiji;
18. predlaga, da morajo v primeru velikih omrežnih javnih storitev konkurenco obvladovati zavezujoče obveznosti javnih storitev, zato da so zagotovljene nujne naložbe in se prepreči nastanek novih monopolov;
19. se zaveda pomena učinkovite konkurenčne politike za uresničitev lizbonske strategije;
20. pozdravlja okolju prijazna merila, ki jih je Komisija uporabila pri potrjevanju več shem za okoljsko pomoč, vključno z merili za železniški promet, in poziva Komisijo, naj pogoje za preglednost takšnih shem razvije še naprej, da bi takšni projekti predstavljali zgled za druge regije in države članice;
21. poziva Komisijo, naj brani svojo doktrino boja proti monopolom in nezakonitim dogovorom ter utemeljene obrazložitve državnih pomoči v bodočih pogajanjih o organizaciji mednarodne trgovine; Komisijo poziva tudi, naj spodbuja mednarodno sodelovanje na področju konkurence s pomočjo instrumentov večstranske ali dvostranske narave in novo nastale države in države v razvoju spodbuja, naj pri tem čedalje bolj sodelujejo;
22. poudarja, da je pomembno spodbujati obveščenost potrošnikov, opozarja na njeno poglavitno vlogo pri zagotavljanju prave kulture konkurence in prav tako poudarja, da je treba preučiti možnosti zasebnih odškodnin v primeru protikonkurenčnega obnašanja;
23. ponovno izraža svojo podporo za bolj proaktivno vlogo Parlamenta pri razvoju politike konkurence z okrepitvijo pooblastil Parlamenta v postopku soodločanja;
24. poziva Komisijo, naj še naprej nadzoruje delovanje sodnega sistema v okviru konkurenčnih zadev, da se hitrost dostopa do sodstva po možnosti izboljša in da se pridobi čim več izkušenj in strokovnega znanja za sodnike, ki obravnavajo konkurenčne zadeve;
25. poziva Komisijo, naj si pomaga z imenovanjem uradnika za stike s potrošniki, z namenom razviti boljše komuniciranje in sodelovanje med Komisijo in potrošniki;
26. verjame, da je učinkovito izvajanje konkurenčne politike pomembno sredstvo za pridobitev učinkovite tržne strukture, ki uveljavlja interese potrošnikov ter ima pozitiven in pomemben vpliv na njihovo vsakdanje življenje; želi poudariti, da tesnejša povezanost notranjega trga včasih omogoča bolj naravno analizo položaja konkurence na celotnem notranjem trgu in ne le na raznih podtrgih; in poziva Komisijo, naj pripravi bolj jasne smernice o svoji opredelitvi "trga" v takšnih primerih;
27. pozdravlja pozitivni odgovor Komisije na priporočila Parlamenta v zvezi z nadaljnjim razvojem evropskih dni konkurence, vključno s sodelovanjem potrošniških organizacij in nacionalnih medijev v procesu načrtovanja evropskih dni konkurence;
28. pozdravlja zavezo Komisije mednarodni mreži organov za varstvo konkurence, zlasti pri pomoči Kitajski pri razvoju osnutka protimonopolne zakonodaje;
29. pozdravlja nenehno napredovanje desetih novih držav članic pri hitrem sprejemanju pravil ES o nadzoru združevanja, pravil konkurence in zlasti predpisov o državni pomoči ter poziva Komisijo, naj nadaljuje s postopkom tehnične pomoči in sodelovanja;
30. naroči svojemu predsedniku, naj to resolucijo posreduje Svetu in Komisiji.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
1. General features of the report
2004 was the first year to see the application of the 2002 and 2003 reforms concerning the control of mergers, cartels and State aids which sought to return to national level the examination of many cases which were burdening the Directorate-General for Competition, despite not having genuinely European implications. Accordingly, the report has a fairly technical (and highly instructive) aspect: the new regulatory framework is gone through, chapter by chapter; this is followed by an analysis of the main cases, and by a few judgments of the Court of Justice which have thus developed case law.
The lack of the searching analyses which were such a feature of the reports drafted under the responsibility of Commissioner Monti is to be regretted. In addition, as frequently happens there is a lamentable lack of references to possible empirical checks on the effects of competition policy.
For instance, it is reaffirmed that the purpose of competition policy is to ensure fair and relatively lively competition which is considered to benefit consumers by reducing excessive margins (abuse of dominant positions) and by stimulating technological emulation. This line of argument bears the mark of common sense. However, as the report comments in passing there are 'market failures', which are not detailed and any thinking about which thus does not contribute to adjusting competition policy. This is regrettable.
An examination of the relative size of the different parts of the report shows that competition policy focuses mainly on the fight against secret agreements and mergers which might result in abuses of dominant positions. Relatively little space is devoted to the policing of State aid. It also emerges that the number of cases in which the Court in Luxembourg invalidates a Commission decision is in decline. It appears that the Commission's practices and case law are finally in step with each other, following the discord over previous years which culminated, in particular, in the Altmark judgment.
2. Combating cartels and abuses of dominant positions
The Commission is to be congratulated on the courage and tenacity with which it fights abuses of monopoly situations. A few significant examples are detailed, including the condemnation of Microsoft. However, appeals are once more under way, so there will be further developments here.
One chapter is devoted to the establishment of the European Competition Network, a form of cooperation between national bodies responsible for regulating competition. It is still far too soon to determine the effectiveness of this system. The obvious risk is of complicity (even unconscious complicity) between national authorities and their 'national champions'. The example of the agreement between the three main French mobile telephony operators (including the historic operator, France Telecom, and its subsidiary, Orange), a secret agreement which was only revealed by the press in 2005, shows that it is not necessarily wise to entrust this kind of supervision to national authorities.
The decentralisation of competition policy is therefore not without risk. We need to think about establishing a '(European) regulator of (national) regulators'.
3. Merger supervision
Here again, the Commission is to be congratulated on the vigilance that it generally demonstrates. The example of the merger between the leading French book publishing and distribution operators is particularly illuminating.
However, the Commission cannot be encouraged enough to embark on genuine studies of the real effect of this policy of 'maintained competition'. Can it really be proved that competition brings down prices? Intuition says that, if supply is there, then competition, by squeezing margins and stimulating research, results in greater purchasing power for consumers in the sector in question and in the growth of the sector and even of employment in it.
Yet another sequence of events is entirely possible: in an oligopolistic situation no competitor has any interest in increasing supply, because there is more to be gained from higher prices in a situation of shortage. We may wonder whether this sequence did not win out in the case of the deregulation of major networked public services. With good reason, the Commission is determined to prevent private monopolies being re-established on the corpses of the former public monopolies (Portuguese electricity and gas), but at least the big old national undertakings, vested with public service obligations, took care to anticipate growth in demand by making the corresponding investments. On the electricity market it seems that this is no longer the case.
4. The case of Rhodia
This case tarnishes the Commission's reputation for a rigorous approach to mergers. It was the subject of a rectifying decision (a unique case among 3000) in January 2004. This modified Decision 1378 of August 1999, which authorised the merger between Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst in return for the divestiture of Rhodia, which was authorised, in parallel, to absorb Albright & Wilson (Decision 1517). There is no retrospective analysis of this rectification; what is worse is that Decisions 1378 and 1517 disappeared from the website while this report was being drafted, thereby hampering parliamentary work.
Rhodia's shares, after a surge caused by the absorption of A & W, have since done nothing but nosedive, bringing ruin on shareholders and workers. It appears that Rhône-Poulenc had loaded on to Rhodia all the liabilities hidden in A & W or resulting from environmental disasters such as Cubatao and Silver Bow. On this point, the Commission has also failed to exercise the duty of control arising from the initial Decision 1378.
Given these anomalies, Parliament should decide to set up a committee of inquiry into the way in which the Commission took Decisions 1378 and 1517 and has handled them.
5. Control of State aid
This chapter is characterised by a divergence between, on the one hand, the stated call for State aid efforts to be focused on horizontal aid designed to promote the Lisbon strategy and, on the other, the strictly legalistic approach to managing this issue, a course which has now been marked out by the Altmark judgment and, since July 2005, by the Commission's new regulatory decisions stemming from that judgment.
Since the public purse is not bottomless, the focus actually has to be on supporting the Lisbon strategy, and this also needs to be taken as a whole: promoting the knowledge-based economy, ensuring social and territorial integration and protecting the environment.
While the first objective (a knowledge-based economy) does indeed appear to have prompted the Commission's benevolent approach with regard to public aid for research and training, the issues of social and territorial integration and protection of the environment have not been handled systematically. If we consider the third component, for instance, we cannot but regret a degree of eclecticism on the part of the Commission.
It first notes, quite correctly, that State aid for revitalising rail transport must be encouraged, because this fits in with the policy of combating climate change. Yet a few pages later, we are somewhat surprised (Ryanair/Charleroi) to find the Directorate-General for Competition encouraging the development of regional airports ... by means of subsidies (which distort competition between cities and between firms) for low-cost airlines, which produce far more greenhouse gases than trains!
Similarly, where energy production is concerned, the objective of environmental protection is overlooked, whereas this is an important criterion for the European Investment Bank.
A special sub-chapter is devoted to State aid for restructuring and rescuing firms. This issue is the one which generates the most reservations among the public. The workers and regions concerned often perceive the Commission's objections as a bureaucratic obstacle which appears out of the blue and jeopardises the solution to a disastrous situation. It is vital that the Commission learns to conduct a dialogue on this point, first by explaining that the key aspect of its work is the fight against monopolies, but also by showing that it knows how to take the human aspects into account. Helping a firm to survive obviously wrongs its competitors, but it would be welcome to have at least some assessment of the effect that the collapse of one of the few remaining firms in an already concentrated sector would have. For instance, apart from the impact on jobs, the disappearance of Alstom would have increased the concentration in the sector substantially.
Conversely, the criteria making it possible to require the reimbursement of public aid which has been misused would well do with clarification. The purpose of such public aid is the common good. The Commission is vigilant about the legitimacy of aid when it is granted. It is much less so when it comes to the use of such aid after it has been granted. For instance, it is obvious that Alstom's expertise and means of production in significant areas, in particular energy production and clean transport, were factors in the decision taken to save it. And then, after this rescue, Alstom sold off its clean energy research centres without the Commission having told it to do so! The case ended up in plenary at the European Parliament (23 September 2003), where Commissioner Verheugen expressed his regret that there was no European legislation to prevent such practices.
The time has come to give thought to, and lay down, a clear policy on who is responsible for checking that firms perform their public service obligations properly, and on who may decide on penalties for firms which use aid to increase their profits instead of serving the public.
POSTOPEK
Naslov
Poročilo o politiki konkurenčnosti 2004
Številka postopka
2005/2209(INI)
Pristojni odbor Datum razglasitve dovoljenja na zasedanju
ECON 17.11.2005
Odbori, zaprošeni za mnenje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
EMPL
17.11.2005
ITRE
17.11.2005
IMCO
17.11.2005
Odbori, ki niso dali mnenja Datum sklepa
EMPL
12.7.2005
ITRE
23.11.2005
IMCO
30.1.2006
Okrepljeno sodelovanje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
Predlog(-i) resolucij(-e), vključeni v poročilo
Poročevalec(-ka) Datum imenovanja
Alain Lipietz
4.7.2005
Nadomeščeni(-a) poročevalec(-ka)
Obravnava v odboru
14.11.2005
23.1.2006
13.2.2006
Datum imenovanja
13.3.2006
Izid končnega glasovanja
za:
proti:
vzdržani:
18
2
13
Poslanci, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Pier Luigi Bersani, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Elisa Ferreira, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Ian Hudghton, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Christoph Konrad, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Enrico Letta, Astrid Lulling, Joseph Muscat, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Karin Riis-Jørgensen, Dariusz Rosati, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė.
Namestniki, navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Jan Andersson, Katerina Batzeli, Mia De Vits, Harald Ettl, Ona Juknevičienė, Werner Langen, Alain Lipietz, Jules Maaten, Diamanto Manolakou, Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk, Charles Tannock, Corien Wortmann-Kool.
Namestniki (člen 17882)), navzoči pri končnem glasovanju
Datum predložitve
20.3.2006
Pripombe (na voljo samo v enem jeziku)
